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 The extra-judicial uadimonium has a long history in the modern literature 
and the common opinion has changed several times.  The changes in opinion 
were provoked by the discovery of new evidence; first, Gaius' Institutes, and 
then, a collection of uadimonia from Herculaneum and Puteoli preserved on 
wax tablets.  With each of these two discoveries the common opinion 
discarded an earlier conception of how the extra-judicial uadimonium <132> 
was used.  Over time a number of sources have been collected as instances of 
the extra-judicial uadimonium, some of which may support only one of these 
discarded conceptions.  It will be useful to identify these sources, in particular 
(1) sources which, in the past, have been interpreted as instances of the extra-
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judicial uadimonium using assumptions about Roman civil procedure that at 
present are less widely accepted; and (2) sources which new evidence suggests 
should not be treated as instances of the extra-judicial uadimonium.  The 
exercise is useful if only to caution against misreading the sources.  It is also 
useful because the chronology which emerges does not support the familiar 
proposition that the extra-judicial uadimonium was a common practice in the 
late Republic*)1). 
I.  Evolution of views on the extra-judicial uadimonium 
 The uadimonium came into use in civil cases with the introduction of the 
formulary procedure, perhaps being expressly introduced by the lex Aebutia in 
the latter half of the second century, B.C.2).  For the duration of the formulary 
procedure3), uadimonia in civil cases are usually distinguished as judicial or 
 
* I am grateful to Prof. D. Nörr and his colleagues at the Leopold-Wenger-Institut für 
Rechtsgeschichte, Munich, for their kindness and assistance during my visit in the spring of 
1999, when this article was prepared. 
The following sources are cited in an abbreviated form.  M. v o n  B e t h m a n n - 
H o l l w e g, Der römische Civilprozeß (Bonn, 1864–66), 3 vols.; L. B o v e, Documenti 
processuali dalle tabulae pompeianae de Murécine (Naples, 1979); G. C a m o d e c a, Tabulae 
Pompeianae Sulpiciorum (Rome, 1999); A. F l i n i a u x, Le vadimonium (Paris, 1908); A. H. 
J. G r e e n i d g e, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (Oxford, 1901); O. K a r l o w a, Der 
römische Civilprozess zur Zeit der Legisactionen (Berlin, 1872); M. K a s e r, Das römische 
Zivilprozessrecht, 2nd ed. rev. K. Hackl (Munich, 1996); O. L e n e l, Das edictum perpetuum, 
3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1927); E. M e t z g e r, A New Outline of the Roman Civil Trial (Oxford, 
1997); A. S t e i n w e n t e r, Vadimonium, in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie der 
classischen Altertumswissenschaft (2nd series) VII (Stuttgart, 1948) 2054; M. V o i g t, Über 
das Vadimonium (Leipzig, 1887); L. W e n g e r, Rechtshistorische Papyrusstudien (Graz, 
1902); J.G. W o l f, Das sogenannte Ladungsvadimonium, in J. A. Ankum, J. E. Spruit, F. B. 
J. Wubbe (edd.), Satura Roberto Feenstra (Freiburg/Schweiz 1985) 59–69. 
The following abbreviations are used below.  Rendiconti Napoli = Rendiconti della 
Accademia di Archeologia Lettere e Belle Arti; RS I, II = M.H. C r a w f o r d (ed.), Roman 
Statutes (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, suppl. 64) (London, 1996), 2 vols.; TP = 
Tabula(e) Pompeiana(e); TP Sulp = Tabula(e) Pompeiana(e) Sulpiciorum; TH = Tabula(e) 
Herculanensis(es). <134> 
1) See the authorities cited below note 29. 
2) The principal evidence is Gell., Noctes Atticae 16. 10. 8.  See F l i n i a u x  37–9; 
K a s e r/H a c k l  68–69 & n. 43. 
3) The introduction of litis denuntiatio may have marked the end of the use of the 
uadimonium (see K a s e r/H a c k l  § 86), as recited by Aur. Vict. de Caes. 16. 11, who 
attributes this reform to Marcus Aurelius.  The passage is notoriously untrustworthy in its 
chronology, however, since it is difficult to attribute the 'repeal' or the 'replacement' of the 
uadimonium to Marcus and still account for its presence in later edictal commentaries.  See 
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extra-judicial4).  A judicial uadimonium arose in the course of a lawsuit, in 
particular during the first phase before the magistrate.  A <135> defendant 
promised that he would appear again before the same magistrate or another 
magistrate.  He would appear again before the same magistrate if the first 
phase could not be completed on the day5).  He would appear before another 
magistrate if the matter exceeded the competence of the magistrate before 
whom he first appeared6).  The judicial uadimonium was treated in the edict of 
the urban praetor and was discussed widely in the juristic literature. 
 The extra-judicial uadimonium was used before a lawsuit was commenced, 
as a means of bringing the defendant before the magistrate7).  On an earlier 
 
F l i n i a u x  108 & n.3; A. S t e i n w e n t e r, Studien zum römischen Versäumnisverfahren 
(Munich 1914) 163 & n.4; M. W l a s s a k, Zum römischen Provinzialprozeß (Vienna 1919) 
37. 
4) The differences are discussed in, e.g., D.T. M u t h e r, Sequestration und Arrest im 
römischen Recht (Leipzig 1856; repr. Amsterdam 1969) 107; A.F. R u d o r f f, Römische 
Rechtsgeschichte II (Leipzig 1859) 212; K a r l o w a  323–33; L. W e n g e r, Institutionen 
des römischen Zivilprozessrechts (Munich 1925) 93–4; B o v e  30–6; C a m o d e c a  49; R. 
D o m i n g o, Estudios sobre el primer título del edicto pretorio II (Universidade de Santiago 
de Compostela 1993) 54; K a s e r/H a c k l  § 31.  A third type of uadimonium, one which 
would bridge the gap between the two phases of a civil lawsuit, was suggested by a passage in 
Macrob. Sat. 1. 16. 14.  See the literature cited in F. L. v o n  K e l l e r & A. W a c h, Der 
römische Civilprocess und die Actionen (Leipzig 1883) 240 n.551; F l i n i a u x  108–10.  The 
text appears to equate uadimonium with comperendinatio, and did not seem to make much 
sense until the discovery of the lex Irnitana, see below notes 120 to 124 and accompanying 
text. <135> 
5) The principal evidence is G. 4. 184. 
6) See especially D o m i n g o  II (note 4) 54–64; Das Gerichtszuständigkeitsedikt des 
Prätors (§ 5), TR 64 (1996) 178–80.  This sort of uadimonium, when undertaken voluntarily, 
is not always classed as judicial.  See, e.g., K a s e r/H a c k l  231 n. 37 (citing Cic. pro Tull. 
20 and II in Verr. 5. 34, both uadimonia to Rome, as instances of the extra-judicial 
uadimonium).  For further discussion of this point see below notes 63 to 76 and accompanying 
text. 
7) This description of the extra-judicial uadimonium is correct for most instances in 
which 'extra-judicial uadimonium' and 'Ladungsuadimonium' are used.  Inevitably the terms 
are sometimes used differently.  F l i n i a u x includes uadimonia by which a third person—
perhaps a procurator, as in Cic. pro Quinct. 7. 29—promises the first appearance of the 
defendant.  F l i n i a u x  65 n. 3.  T o m u l e s c u distinguishes extra-judicial uadimonia 
which are bilateral and compulsory from those which are unilateral and non-compulsory.  (C. 
St. T o m u l e s c u, Das aussergerichtliche uadimonium in den in Herculanum gefundenen 
Wachstafeln, RIDA (3rd series) 17 (1970) 320ff.).  A uadimonium which is exacted in order to 
bring a party before a competent magistrate—sometimes called a 'Verweisungsuadimonium'; 
see below notes 69 to 74 and accompanying text—may be regarded as a uadimonium which 
'introduces a lawsuit' (though one could not regard it as 'extra-judicial').  A portion of the lex 
agraria (111 B.C.; RS I, no. 2) has been treated in this way.  At line 34 (and also perhaps at 
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view, long rejected, the urban edict gave a person who was summoned a 
choice of either following the plaintiff to the tribunal immediately, or 
promising by uadimonium to appear at a particular time8).  On a later view, 
which has wide support, the extra-judicial uadimonium was not treated in 
<136> the edict, but was a purely voluntary act by the defendant9).  The 
defendant chose to engage with the plaintiff in this way because by so doing 
he could both avoid the immediacy of the in ius uocatio and arrive before the 
magistrate in a better state of preparation10).  The plaintiff, on this view of the 
extra-judicial uadimonium, also had an interest in engaging with the defendant 
for the latter's appearance.  By so doing the plaintiff avoided the risk that the 
defendant himself was not available11), and with the defendant in a better state 
of preparation fewer adjournments in iure were necessary.  Quite apart from 
the interests of either party, the in ius uocatio has been seen by some as a 
coarse and unseemly way of introducing a suit, particularly where a 
respectable person was to be sued12), and has been seen also as a cumbersome 
method of summoning those for whom the plaintiff required permission before 
summons13). 
 This later view, despite its departure from the earlier view, retained one 
aspect: an extra-judicial uadimonium continued to be regarded as a practice 
 
line 36, reconstructed by analogy to line 34) the law refers to uadimonium in the course of 
seeking to assure that controversies over certain lands are heard only by certain magistrates.  
In its several reconstructions (except M o m m s e n ' s first, 1863), the provision says that a 
party's refusal to promise a uadimonium for appearance before a competent magistrate does 
not bar that magistrate from issuing a decree in the case.  The statute is therefore anticipating 
that a uadimonium is exacted by a magistrate who is not competent, for appearance before a 
magistrate who is competent.  R u d o r f f  (note 4, 212 n. 6) and C r a w f o r d  (RS I, p. 168) 
refer to this uadimonium as a Ladungsuadimonium.  This is consistent with the common use of 
the term only insofar as this uadimonium introduces a lawsuit. 
8) This is discussed below in section II. <136> 
9) See, e.g., v o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g II 198–200; K a r l o w a  328–33; T. 
K i p p, Die Litisdenuntiation als Prozeßeinleitungsform im römischen Civilprozeß (Leipzig 
1887) 113; W. K u n k e l, Epigraphik und Geschichte des römischen Privatrechts, in Vestigia: 
Beiträge zur alten Geschichte 17 (Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für Griechische 
und Lateinische Epigraphik) (Munich 1973) 210; B o v e 31. 
10) V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 199; F l i n i a u x  105; G. P u g l i e s e, Il 
processo civile romano II (Milan 1963) 401. 
11) P u g l i e s e  II (note 10) 401. 
12) V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 199 & n. 15; F l i n i a u x  105: 'Nous savons 
... qu'il devint le mode de citation usité entre gens de bonne société.' 
13) P u g l i e s e  II (note 10) 401.  Gaius' Institutes [G.] 4. 183: Quasdam tamen 
personas sine permissu praetoris in ius uocare non licet, ueluti parentes patronos patronas, 
item liberos et parentes patroni patronaeue, et in eum qui aduersus ea egerit poena 
constituitur. 
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which the litigants resorted to in place of the in ius uocatio14).  Under the 
earlier view, the edict offered the defendant the choice of following the 
plaintiff or giving a uadimonium; under the later view, the defendant exercised 
the same choice, but did so out of a regard for his own interests. <137> 
 The current view of the extra-judicial uadimonium is in most respects 
similar to the one just described.  It differs only in the rôle it assigns to the in 
ius uocatio.  The difference of view came about as a consequence of the 
discovery of uadimonium documents from Herculaneum and Puteoli.  Before 
these discoveries it was widely assumed that when a person promised by 
uadimonium to appear, he promised to appear before the pertinent magistrate 
or court15).  This is perhaps a natural reading of Gaius' words at Institutes 4. 
184, where we are told that when business cannot be finished in one day, the 
person called in ius 'promittat se ... sisti' on some other occasion.  Yet to the 
contrary, the new documents suggest that a person would promise to appear, 
not before a magistrate, but at a particular location close by the place where 
the magistrate would administer justice16).  The new documents have therefore 
forced a re-evaluation of the idea that the extra-judicial uadimonium was used 
 
14) V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g II 198; G r e e n i d g e  142–3; W e n g e r  (note 
4) 94; G. P u g l i e s e, Les voies de recours sanctionnant l'in ius uocatio, RIDA 2 (1949) 253; 
F. L a  R o s a, Il uindex nella in ius uocatio e il garante del uadimonium, in Studi Betti III 
(Milan 1962) 325 n. 77; W. W. B u c k l a n d, A Textbook of Roman Law, 3rd ed. rev. P. 
Stein (Cambridge 1963) 63; P u g l i e s e  II (note 10) 401; K u n k e l  (note 9) 210; B o v e  
24–5; J. L. M u r g a, Derecho romano clasico II (Universidad de Zaragoza 1980) 264; V. 
A r a n g i o - R u i z, Istituzioni di diritto romano, 14th ed. (Naples 1982) 135. <137> 
15) See e.g. V o i g t  345, who reconstructs the uadimonium which Cicero refers to at 
pro Quinct. 7. 29 and 21. 67 as follows: P. Quinctium idibus Septembribus i n  i u r e  
c o r a m  B u r r i e n o  p r a e t o r e sisti et, si ita factum non erit, tum x aeris tibi dare 
promitto.  Similarly, R u d o r f f  II (note 4) 211 n. 1.  L e n e l also assumed that a 
uadimonium to Rome would make reference to the magistrate before whom the promisor was 
to appear.  O. L e n e l, Beiträge zur Kunde des Edicts und der Edictcommentare, SZ 2 (1881) 
38. 
16) See e.g. TH 6 (in foro Augusto ante signum Dianae Luciferae); TH 14 (in foro 
Augusto ante tribunal praetoris urbani); TH 15 (in foro Augusto ante aede Martis Ultoris); 
TP Sulp 1–8, 9?, 10–11, (in foro ante aram (Augusti) Hordionianam).  This may have been a 
feature of the Verweisungsuadimonium as well; R o d g e r points out that lex Irni. c. 84, ll. 
20–3, and a 'Letter of Vinicius' (27 B.C, quoted below note 71) permit a 
Verweisungsuadimonium for appearance wherever the magistrate shall be on the promised 
day.  A. R o d g e r, Vadimonium to Rome (and Elsewhere), SZ 114 (1997) 161–3.  The idea 
that a person promised to appear near a tribunal was, to some degree, apparent in some literary 
sources.  See Cic. pro Quinct. 6. 25 (appearance ad tabulam Sextiam); Hor. Sat. 1. 9. 35 
(appearance ad Vestae).  On these latter sources see the literature cited in W o l f  65 n.28, and 
C. G i o r d a n o, Su alcune tavolette cerate dell'agro Murecine, Rendiconti Napoli (n.s.) 41 
(1966 but 1967) 111–12. <138> 
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in place of the in ius uocatio.  This idea, it will be recalled, is a survival from 
the very earliest view of the extra-judicial uadimonium, which accepted that 
the edict of the urban praetor gave the uocatus a choice of either following the 
plaintiff or making a uadimonium.  The new documents suggest instead that 
the in ius uocatio retained its function even where the extra-judicial 
uadimonium was used: the defendant promised to appear close by the 
magistrate's tribunal, and on <138> his appearance the in ius uocatio was used 
to persuade him to go the rest of the way17). 
 The proposition that the extra-judicial uadimonium could not have 
replaced the in ius uocatio, first argued by W o l f, is confirmed by an 
examination of the two earlier views.  This is the subject of section II below.  
The consequences of this proposition to our understanding of the extra-judicial 
uadimonium is the subject of sections III and IV, which treat the literary and 
documentary evidence, respectively.  Most of the literary evidence relates to 
the late Republic, and tends to support the earlier views.  Much of this 
evidence does not support the current view, and as a result the extra-judicial 
uadimonium is not well attested for the late Republic.  The current view also 
affects the documentary evidence; the extra-judicial uadimonium is now 
assimilated to the judicial uadimonium to such a degree, that one can no longer 
identify all of the documents as instances of the extra-judicial uadimonium.  
The discussion of the literary and documentary evidence also takes account of 
other improvements in our understanding of civil procedure, in addition to the 
light shed by the current view. 
II.  The edictal view  
 The view that the extra-judicial uadimonium was not used in place of the 
 
17) For the development of this interpretation, see W o l f  63–5.  See also 
K a s e r/H a c k l  231 ('In [dem freiwilligen uadimonium] verpflichtet sich der Gegner mit 
seinem Stipulationsversprechen, zu einer bestimmten Zeit an einem bestimmten Ort, der in der 
Nähe der Gerichtsstätte liegt, zu erscheinen.  Scheitert bei diesem Treffen der Versuch, sich 
doch noch außergerichtlich zu einigen, kann von hier aus mit in ius uocatio vor Gericht 
geladen werden.'); K. Hackl, SZ 109 (1992) 768 n.3; C a m o d e c a  49; A. B ü r g e, Zum 
Edikt De edendo, SZ 112 (1995) 4–5.  G i m é n e z - C a n d e l a also argues on the basis of 
the new documents that the extra-judicial uadimonium did not replace the in ius uocatio, 
though her views are slightly different from those just cited.  In her view the new evidence 
shows that the defendant makes his promise to appear at the urging of the plaintiff, but that the 
in ius uocatio is the first step in a summons-procedure which induces the execution of the 
extra-judicial uadimonium.  See T. G i m e n e z - C a n d e l a, Notas en torno al 
"uadimonium", SDHI 48 (1982) 135, 165. <139> 
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in ius uocatio is well supported in the new documentary evidence.  The 
evolution of the extra-judicial uadimonium in the modern literature confirms 
this view; the assumption that these two institutions were alternatives seems to 
have been almost a matter of accident.  It is useful to discuss how this 
assumption found its way into the modern literature before considering its 
consequences. <139> 
 The extra-judicial uadimonium was founded initially on the rubric to D. 2, 
6: 
In ius uocati ut eant aut satis uel cautum dent. 
That those who are called in ius should go, or provide a surety or an undertaking. 
This text has long been recognised as interpolated; the aut satis uel cautum 
dent is probably a reference to the defendant's cautio iudicio sisti in the late 
procedure introduced by libellus, a cautio which might be accompanied by a 
surety18).  The original contents of the praetor's edict are less transparent.  It is 
now widely accepted that in its original state this portion of the edict treated 
the in ius uocatio and the uindex, and recited the civil law19): a uocatus was 
permitted either to appear or to give a uindex who would appear for him.  The 
fact that there is a reasonable degree of agreement on the contents of the edict 
we owe largely to Gaius' Institutes20): 
Ceterae quoque formulae quae sub titulo DE IN IUS VOCANDO 
propositae sunt, in factum conceptae sunt, uelut aduersus eum qui in ius 
uocatus neque uenerit neque uindicem dederit; .... 
 
18) See K a s e r/H a c k l  § 87 II. 
19) On the rule in the civil law, see XII Tab. I, 1–4; Gell. NA 16. 10; W. S e l b, Das 
prätorische Edikt, in H.-P. Benöhr, et al. (edd.), Iuris Professio (Vienna 1986) 269. 
20) G. 4. 46.  This is the principal text on which both L e n e l and R u d o r f f 
reconstruct the edictal clause referred to in the D. 2, 6 rubric.  See L e n e l § 11 (IN IUS 
VOCATI UT EANT AUT VINDICEM DENT); A. F. R u d o r f f, Edicti Perpetui Quae 
Reliqua Sunt (Leipzig, 1869) § 14 (IN IUS VOCATI UT VENIANT AUT VINDICEM 
DENT).  The Gaius passage is valuable mainly because in mentioning two alternatives it 
presumably excludes a third, but also because in mentioning an actio in factum against one 
who does not give a uindex, Gaius discourages the idea that he somehow intends a reference 
to the uadimonium, which is sued upon by a civil-law actio ex stipulatu.  On these arguments 
and others see O. L e n e l, Der Vindex bei der in ius uocatio, SZ 25 (1904) 232–54; P. F. 
G i r a r d, Manuel élémentaire de droit romain, 8th ed. (Paris 1929) 1062 n.2; cf. S. 
S c h l o ß m a n n, Der Vindex bei der in ius uocatio, SZ 24 (1903) 325 & n.1, perhaps the last 
proponent of the older view, arguing that the uel cautum is probably interpolated but that the 
satisdent may have been part of the edict. 
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The other formulae which are published under the title 'de in ius uocando' 
are also framed in factum, for instance the formula against one who is 
summoned to court and neither comes nor gives a uindex; .... 
Before the discovery of Gaius's Institutes, however, it was not nearly so clear 
whether, and to what degree, the praetor had innovated on the matter of the in 
ius uocatio21).  Though some recognized that the civil law probably <140> 
allowed the uocatus either to appear or to give a uindex22), many concluded, 
on the basis of the D. 2. 6 rubric, that the praetor had improved the civil law 
regime by allowing a defendant to promise his appearance at a later date 
 
21) The compilers have made the matter particularly difficult, because throughout the 
Digest they have replaced references to the uindex with something like 'fideiussor <140> 
iudicio sistendi causa datus' (see L e n e l 65) and references to uadimonium promittere with 
something like 'iudicio sistendi promittere'; see Paul (6 ed.) D. 2, 8, 16; Gaius (1 prov. ed.) D. 
2, 11, 1.  That D. 2, 6 treated the uindex is not in doubt, but other texts where, on Lenel's 
argument, fideiussor is interpolated for uindex, have been construed by some as having treated 
the uadimonium.  See L a  R o s a (note 14) 326, where it is argued that Paul (4 ed.) D. 2, 8, 4, 
which speaks about a fideiussor who has guaranteed the appearance of one who dies after the 
decree to exhibit him, originally addressed uadimonium, not uindex.  L a  R o s a suggests that 
this decree is analogous to the decree to compel a uadimonium in the lex de Gallia Cisalpina, 
col. 2, ll. 21–4.  Id. 311–13.  On Ulpian (5 ed.) D. 2, 8, 2, 5, see S c h l o ß m a n n  (note 20) 
311–12; L e n e l ' s response (note 20) 251–2; and G i m é n e z - C a n d e l a ' s support for 
S c h l o ß m a n n  (note 17) 143–4. 
22) See A. H. van Hees, Dissertatio philologico-juridica inauguralis de iis, quae 
antiquitus apud Romanos inter litigatores ante litem contestatem fiebant (Leiden 1747), 
reprinted in D. Fellenberg (ed.), Jurisprudentia Antiqua I (Berne 1760) 529; C. F. G. Meister, 
Vindex et Vas, in Selecta Opuscula (Göttingen 1766) 278, 284; A. Schulting, Notae ad 
Digesta seu Pandectas I, ed. N. Smallenberg (Leiden, 1804) 278.  Prior to the discovery of 
Gaius' Institutes, the use of the uindex at in ius uocatio was suggested by three sources: Festus 
(P.574), s.v. Vindex, in W. M. Lindsay (ed.), Sexti Pompei Festi de uerborum significatu 
(Leipzig 1913; repr. 1997) 516, defining the act of the uindex in such a way—'quo minus is 
qui prensus est ab aliquo, teneatur'—as to apply to the uindex both at in ius uocatio and at 
execution of judgment (see G. 4. 21, 25); Gell. NA 16. 10 (addressing who may be uindex 
under the Twelve Tables); Gaius (1 duod. tab.) D. 2, 4, 22, 1: Qui in ius uocatus est, duobus 
casibus dimittendus est: si quis eius personam defendet, et si, dum in ius uenitur, de re 
transactum fuerit.  ('Defendere' is perhaps used in a non-technical way.)  Godefroy 
constructed part of Table I of the Twelve Tables almost entirely on the basis of the Gaius 
passage: SI ENSIET, QUI ENDO VIA EM VINDICIT, MITTITO.  J. Godefroy, Fragmenta 
XII. Tabularum suis nunc primum tabulis restituta (Heidelberg 1616) 153–4.  Some writers, 
however, argued that the civil law flatly required the uocatus to follow, and that it was the 
harshness of this rule that the praetor sought to ameliorate.  J. Raevard, Tribonianus (Antwerp 
1561) 7–8; J. Cujas, Observationes et Emendationes lib. 10, c. 10 (1569), in Opera Prior III 
(Paris 1658) cols. 282–3; J. Cujas, Recitationes solemnes (1605) at C.2.2, in Opera Postuma V 
(Paris 1658) cols. 20–4.  See also F. Hotman, Commentarius de uerbis iuris (Lyon 1569), s.v. 
Vas (a defendant must come or give a uas). 
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instead of appearing immediately23).  It was not the case that earlier writers 
<141> overlooked the possibility of interpolation, but rather that they 
underestimated the extent of the interpolation, assuming that the words of the 
Digest rubric, though altered by Tribonian to suit his time, nevertheless 
accurately revealed a practice introduced by the praetor.  Accordingly some 
seized on satis dent and argued that a uocatus could avoid following the 
plaintiff immediately by promising to appear and providing a surety; some 
identified this promise with the uadimonium of the classical law24).  Others 
argued that cautum dent referred to a cautio which allowed a defendant to 
promise, perhaps with a surety, to appear at a later time; again, some identified 
this promise with the uadimonium of the classical law25).  And for some time 
after the discovery of Gaius' Institutes—which brought proof of both the 
uindex at in ius uocatio (4. 46) and uadimonium cum satisdatione (4. 185)—it 
was common to read that the civil law offered the in ius uocatus only the 
alternative of a uindex, but that the praetor permitted a second alternative—the 
uadimonium with a surety26). <142> 
 
23) H. Doneau, Commentaria de jure ciuili (1596), lib. 23, c. 9, in Opera Omnia VI 
(Florence 1846) cols. 143–4 (also briefly Commentaria in codicem Justiniani, Leiden 1587, at 
tit. 2, lib. 2, in Opera Omnia VII, Florence 1846, cols. 80–1); Cujas (1569), (note 22) cols. 
282–3; Raevard (note 22) 7–8; Cujas (1605) (note 22) cols. 20–4; G. Averani, Interpretationes 
Juris (Leiden 1751) 121; B. Voorda, Dissertatio juridica <141> inauguralis de uadimonio 
(1751), in D. Fellenberg (ed.), Jurisprudentia Antiqua II (Berne 1761) 14; Meister (note 22) 
284–5; U. Huber, Praelectionum juris ciuilis tomi tres secundum Institutiones et Digesta 
Justiniani (Louvain 1766) 95; G. Noodt, Commentarius ad Digesta seu Pandectas, in Opera 
Omnia II (Leiden 1767) 44; J. Westenberg, Principia juris secundum ordinem Digestorum seu 
Pandectarum (Berlin 1814) 75. 
24) Cujas (1569) (note 22) cols. 282–3; Cujas (1605) (note 22) cols. 20–4; Obseruationes 
et emendationes libri XVIII - XXIIII (Cologne 1587) 331–2; Noodt (note 23) 44.  See also the 
authorities cited below note 26.  Cujas reads the Digest rubric with only the alternative of 
satisdatio included: In jus uocati ut eant, aut satisdent.  In omitting uel cautum he may be 
following Gregor Haloander, Digestorum seu Pandectarum libri quinquaginta (Nürnberg 
1529) 54 (at D. 2. 5: 'In ius uocati ut eant, uel satis dent').  The idea that one required a surety 
to avoid having to appear immediately was suggested by Gaius (1 prov. ed.) D. 2, 8, 5, 1: Qui 
pro rei qualitate euidentissime locupletem uel, si dubitetur, adprobatum fideiussorem iudicio 
sistendi causa non acceperit: iniuriarum actio aduersus eum esse potest, quia sane non 
quaelibet iniuria est duci in ius eum, qui satis idoneum fideiussorem det. 
25) Doneau (1587) (note 23) cols. 80–1; Raevard (note 22) 7–8; Averani (note 23) 121; 
Voorda (note 23) 14; van Hees (note 22) 529; Huber (note 23) 95; Westenberg (note 23) 75. 
26) See M. v o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g, Handbuch des Civilprozesses I (Bonn 
1834) 247 (but cf. v o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 198–200); P. C o l q u h o u n, A 
Summary of the Roman Civil Law III (London 1853) 320; M u t h e r  (note 4) 108–13 (but 
expressing doubts that a surety was always needed); R u d o r f f  II (note 4) 209–12 (but cf. 
R u d o r f f, note 20, § 14); K. W i e d i n g, Justinianeische Libellprocess (Vienna 1865) 571; 
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 Although this line of reasoning eventually disappeared from the literature, 
a shadow of it remained.  The extra-judicial uadimonium was no longer 
founded on the rubric to D. 2. 6, but it was assumed that a uocatus 
nevertheless exercised the same choice as had earlier been furnished him by 
the rubric.  The possibility that the extra-judicial uadimonium might have 
some different relation with the in ius uocatio was not considered. 
 The persistence of this assumption affected the kind of evidence brought 
forward as examples of the extra-judicial uadimonium.  After the rejection of 
the edictal view, and before the discovery of the Herculaneum and Puteoli 
uadimonia, the extra-judicial uadimonium was studied almost entirely from 
literary sources27).  These sources had already been brought forward in support 
of the rejected edictal view, but were still regarded as relevant on the strength 
of a particular argument from silence.  On the assumption that an extra-
judicial uadimonium was used in place of the in ius uocatio, an extra-judicial 
uadimonium could be identified in a literary text, not on the basis of anything 
expressly stated, but by the absence of any reference to in ius uocatio28).  This 
sort of argument made it possible to claim that the scarcity of references to in 
ius uocatio in Cicero suggested that, at least up to Cicero's time, the extra-
judicial uadimonium was the ordinary and customary way of commencing a 
lawsuit in preference to the in ius uocatio29).  Conclusions <143> derived in 
 
C.F. v o n  G l ü c k, Ausführliche Erläuterung der Pandecten III (Erlangen 1867) 418; 
K e l l e r /W a c h  (note 4) 238–9. <142> 
27) The exceptions were the lex agraria, on which see above note 7, and Paul (1 Plaut.) 
D. 2, 11, 10, 2 and Ulpian (75 ed.) D. 44, 2, 5, discussed below note 128. 
28) See e.g. A. W. Heffter, Institutionen des römischen und teutschen Civilprocesses 
(Bonn 1825) 276 n.4; M. F u h r m a n n (ed.), Marcus Tullius Cicero. Sämtliche Reden I 
(Zürich 1970) 54.  Sources treated in this way are discussed individually below. 
29) V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g makes this claim both in his earlier book, which 
follows the edictal theory, and his later book, which abandons that theory in favour of the non-
edictal, voluntary Ladungsuadimonium: 'Von diesem Vadimonium finden wir daher bei 
Cicero unzählige Beispiele; von der in ius uocatio nicht Eines ....'  V o n  B e t h m a n n - 
H o l l w e g  (note 26) 247.  On Cic. pro Quinct. 19. 61 ('in ius uocas'), see below notes 49–58 
and accompanying text.  See also M u t h e r  (note 4) 108: 'Ganz anderer Natur ist die zweite 
Art de uadimonium, die schon zu Cicero's Zeit vorkommt.  Die Parteien können sich ohne 
förmliche in ius uocatio über einen Tag, wo sie vor dem Prätor erscheinen wollen, einigen.'; 
v o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 199: 'Bei Cicero erscheint [diese neue Einleitungsform] 
daher durchaus als das gewöhnliche Verfahren ....'; W. A. H u n t e r, A Systematic and 
Historical Exposition of Roman Law, 2nd ed. (London 1885) 972: '... by the end of the 
Republic, uadimonia seem to have been a regular way of beginning a civil lawsuit.'; 
G r e e n i d g e  142: 'The [in ius uocatio] was still theoretically existent in Cicero's day, but it 
was seldom resorted to.  A gentler but equally effective means had been developed in the form 
of uadimonium.'; F l i n i a u x  105: 'Nous savons qu[e le uadimonium extrajudiciaire] est déjà 
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this way are doubtful under the current view.  If, as now believed, the in ius 
uocatio continued to fulfil its function even where the extra-judicial 
uadimonium was employed, then an extra-judicial uadimonium cannot be 
identified in a source on the argument that the source is silent on the matter of 
in ius uocatio. 
III.  Literary evidence 
 This section discusses the proposition that the extra-judicial uadimonium 
was a common practice in the late Republic.  The proposition rests almost 
entirely on passages in Cicero.  There are other literary sources which are later 
than Cicero and whose relevance to the extra-judicial uadimonium is 
uncertain, and these sources are not the subject of the discussion below30). 
a)  Cicero, pro Quinctio 
 The literary evidence on which the extra-judicial uadimonium principally 
relies is Cicero's speech on behalf of Publius Quinctius, delivered in 81 B.C.  
 
très employé à l'époque de Cicéron ....'; J.M. K e l l y, Roman Litigation (Oxford 1966) 6–7:  
<143> 'Towards the end of the Republic actual in ius uocatio came to be generally replaced, 
as a means of initiating litigation, by uadimonium, ... and this is the procedure found, for 
example, in all the speeches of Cicero.'; K u n k e l  (note 9) 210: 'Doch begegnet schon bei 
Cicero auch in der stadtrömischen Praxis statt [der in ius uocatio] auch das 
Zitationsvadimonium ....' 
30) Of these, the most relevant to republican procedure is Livy 23. 32 (writing of the late 
3rd-century B.C.): ... praetores, quorum iuris dictio erat, tribunalia ad Piscinam publicam 
posuerunt; eo uadimonia fieri iusserunt, ibique eo anno ius dictum est. V o i g t  325 cites this 
as evidence for the extra-judicial uadimonium, apparently on the understanding that litigants 
were ordered to make their extra-judicial uadimonia to the place where justice was 
administered.  I do not understand why he interprets it in this way.  In any event, under the 
current view litigants do not promise to appear where justice is administered.  A second 
literary source may also be relevant: Hor. Sat. 1. 9. 36, which speaks of a defendant who 
makes a uadimonium 'lest he lose the case'.  The passage has been much discussed and its 
meaning remains mysterious.  See S t e i n w e n t e r  2060–1.  Two other literary sources are 
late and their relevance to the present discussion is uncertain.  Aur. Vict. de Caes. 16. 11 
(praising the accomplishments of Marcus Aurelius): Legum ambigua mire distincta, 
uadimoniorumque solemni remoto, denuntiandae litis operiendaeque ad diem commode ius 
introductum.  The uadimonia referred to are understood to be extra-judicial uadimonia by, 
e.g., F l i n i a u x  106–7 and M. W l a s s a k, Zum römischen Provinzialprozeß (Vienna 
1919) 37–59.  Also, Juv. Sat. 3. 297–99, which describes a person striking another and then 
'making a uadimonium'.  This uadimonium facere appears to be used metaphorically; roughly 
translated: 'threaten to come back and do it again'. <144> 
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The speech contains three references to uadimonia that some have identified 
as extra-judicial.  The discussion below suggests that these references would 
not be interpreted in this way under the current view of the extra- <144> 
judicial uadimonium and with the benefit of the new documentary evidence.  
Because a good deal turns on the sequence of events in this case, it will be 
useful first to set out a procedural chronology which puts each of the disputed 
uadimonia in context.  (Entries below indicated by bold type contain the 
disputed passages.) 
1. Quinctius' brother (Naeuius' partner) dies in Gaul, and 
Quinctius, his heir, goes to Gaul.  3. 14, 15. 
2. Roughly a year passes.  3. 15. 
3. Naeuius dissuades Quinctius from selling property in Narbo, 
the proceeds of which would be used to pay off some of 
Quinctius' debts in Rome.  4. 15, 16. 
4. Quinctius and Naeuius go to Rome.  4. 17. 
5. Quinctius asks Naeuius for some money; Naeuius refuses, 'nisi 
prius de rebus rationibusque societatis omnibus decidisset et 
scisset sibi cum Quinctio controuersiae nihil futurum'.  5. 18, 
19. 
6. Quinctius calls on Naeuius to have the matter settled.  5. 20. 
7. Naeuius appoints Trebellius as his representative; Quinctius 
appoints Alfenus.  5. 21. 
8. It is not possible to settle the matter.  5. 21. 
9. 'res esse in uadimonium coepit'.  5. 22.  'uadimonia saepe 
dilata'.  5. 22.  'cum ... in uadimoniis differendis tempus omne 
consumpserit'.  14. 46. 
10. 'uenit ad uadimonium Naeuius'.  5. 22. 
11. Naeuius says that he 'had taken care' that the partnership did not 
owe him anything, and that he did not want to be promised, nor 
to promise, any further uadimonia; Quinctius did not request 
bail from Naeuius; he left 'sine uadimonio'.  6. 23; 13. 46; 28. 
8631). 
 
31) Much of the case turns on whether, at this point in the proceedings or perhaps a few 
days later, Quinctius in fact became bound to appear by uadimonium.  W o l f says rightly that 
one might mistrust Cicero's denials.  J. G. W o l f, Die litis contestatio im römischen 
Zivilprozeß (Karlsruhe 1968) 14.  Cicero's language is evasive: Naeuius 'said' he would not 
ask for bail (6. 23), but did he?  The parties departed 'sine vadimonio' (6. 23), but did b o t h 
parties depart 'sine vadimonio'?  Cicero's principal argument on the question (18. 57, 58) is 
that a person who was not present could not make a uadimonium, which is true enough, except 
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12. Quinctius postpones bail that he has with others, so that he can 
go to Gaul.  6. 23. <145> 
13. On 27 or 29 January, Quinctius leaves Rome32).  6. 24; 18. 57. 
14. On 5 February (Naeuius claims), a uadimonium was made for 
Quinctius' appearance.  18. 57. 
15. Naeuius invites witnesses to the tabula Sextia, to witness that 
Quinctius has not appeared to his uadimonium.  6. 25; 14. 47. 
16. On 20 February, Naeuius applies to the praetor Burrienus for 
bona possidere under the edict, giving the reason that Quinctius 
had not appeared to his uadimonium.  The praetor orders the 
goods to be advertised for sale33).  6. 25; 14. 48; 15. 48; 18. 56; 
19. 60; 25. 79. 
17. Alfenus takes down the notices of sale, takes back a seized 
slave, and identifies himself as procurator to Quinctius.  6. 27; 
19. 61; 20. 63; 22. 73; 29. 89. 
18. Naeuius asserts that Quinctius owes him money; Alfenus 
denies it.  13. 4434); 19. 61. 
19. Naeuius asks Alfenus to promise a uadimonium; Alfenus does 
so.  19. 61; 20. 63. 
20. Naeuius summons Alfenus in ius; Alfenus follows.  19. 61. 
21. Naeuius demands a trial; Alfenus says that, if Naeuius wishes 
 
that Cicero left behind a procurator, who did indeed on a subsequent occasion (7. 29; 21. 67) 
promise Quinctius' appearance.  Cicero's other arguments similarly appeal to logic rather than 
facts: that it was not seemly for Naeuius to go running to the praetor (15. 48), that a decent 
person waits until several uadimonia have been ignored (16. 51, 52), and that Quinctius was 
both kin and a partner to Naeuius (16. 52).  The closest one finds to denials on Cicero's part 
seem, as it were, one step removed from assertions: 'Mitto illud dicere ... eum, qui tibi 
uadimonium non deseruisset ....' (27. 85); 'Docui ... omnino vadimonium nullum fuisse ....' 
(28. 86).  Of course if Cicero is speaking in a political climate in which facts are not likely to 
be important, see H. J. R o b y, Roman Private Law II (Cambridge 1902) 470–1, his 
evasiveness may not be significant in the way suggested. <145> 
32) On the dates, cf. the two cited passages. 
33) Quinctius' property in Gaul is possessed on 23 February.  25. 79.  Naeuius had waited 
until 20 February, two weeks after Quinctius' purported promise was made, perhaps to allow 
the possession to take place after the praetor's order.  See R o b y II (note 31) 458 (estimating 
fourteen days travel between Rome and the estate), and 483 (expressing the opinion that there 
may have been nothing improper in anticipating the praetor's decision in this way). 
34) The reference to Naeuius' demand for money at 13. 44 is made without any reference 
to chronology, but it may refer to the demand and denial which Cicero notes at 19. 61.  In any 
event it is not a subject of the action which ensued; '"Non," inquit, "id ago"' (13. 43), are the 
words Cicero puts into Naeuius' mouth.  See the discussion below at notes 50 to 56 and 
accompanying text. <146> 
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it, he, Alfenus, will defend at a iudicium.  6. 27; 19. 61; 20. 62, 
63; 22. 73. 
22. Naeuius asks Alfenus for security, in the event Quinctius loses 
the suit; Alfenus refuses.  7. 29; 20. 63. 
23. Alfenus appeals to the tribunes.  7. 29; 20. 63. 
24. The tribune Brutus says that he will intervene unless Alfenus 
and Naeuius come to some agreement.  20. 65; 21. 69. 
25. Alfenus summons citizens to witness, in Naeuius' hearing, that 
Quinctius does not owe the money Naeuius claims, but that he, 
Alfenus, is ready to accept any trial which Naeuius announces.  
21. 66, 67. 
26. Alfenus promises that Quinctius will appear on 13 September.  
7. 29; 21. 67. 
27. Quinctius returns to Rome, and asks Naeuius on what day 
(eight months earlier) the uadimonium had taken place; 
Naeuius says 5 February.  18. 57. 
28. Quinctius appears to the uadimonium promised by Alfenus.  8. 
30; 21. 67. 
29. Naeuius applies to the praetor Dolabella for Quinctius to give 
security for payment of the judgment, in accordance with the 
edict which allows such security from one whose goods have 
been possessed for thirty days in accordance with the praetor's 
edict.  8. 30. <146> 
30. Quinctius disputes whether his goods have in fact been 
'possessed for thirty days in accordance with the praetor's 
edict', and Dolabella orders the parties to engage in a sponsio 
on this issue.  8. 30; 14. 46; 27. 84. 
31. Quinctius engages in the sponsio, declining to give security; he 
sues on the sponsio.  9. 32. 
i)  uadimonia prior to the grant of possession (5. 22; 6. 23; 18. 57) 
 After Naeuius and Quinctius realised they could not settle the matter of 
their debts privately, they made a number of uadimonia to one another35): 
Itaque ex eo tempore res esse in uadimonium coepit.  Cum uadimonia saepe dilata essent 
et cum aliquantum temporis in ea re esset consumptum neque quicquam profectum esset, 
 
35) That Quinctius made at least one uadimonium to Naeuius we know from 'Ait 
[Naeuius] ... neque uadari amplius', 6. 23, and that Naeuius made at least one uadimonium to 
Quinctius we know from 'uenit ad uadimonium Naeuius', 5. 22. 
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uenit ad uadimonium Naeuius.  (5. 22). 
And so from that point the matter entered a uadimonium phase.  After several uadimonia 
were postponed and a good deal of time used up in the matter without any progress, 
Naeuius appears to his uadimonium. 
At the meeting to which Naeuius appears, perhaps the final (?) meeting before 
Quinctius left Rome, Cicero claims there were no further promises to appear. 
Ait [Naeuius] ... se iam neque uadari amplius neque uadimonium promittere; si quid agere 
secum uelit Quinctius, non recusare.  Hic cum rem Gallicanam cuperet reuisere, hominem 
in praesentia non uadatur; ita sine uadimonio disceditur.  (6. 23). 
[Naeuius] says ... he is no longer asking for a uadimonium to be promised to him nor is he 
promising a uadimonium; that if Quinctius wishes to sue him for something, he does not 
refuse.  Since Quinctius wanted to visit his property in Gaul again, he does not ask for a 
uadimonium from Naeuius; thus they leave without a uadimonium. 
However, Naeuius later claims that a uadimonium was made for Quinctius' 
appearance (18. 57); whether it was on the foregoing occasion is not clear 
from the speech. 
 The uadimonia described in these excerpts have been interpreted by some 
as extra-judicial because no in ius uocatio is mentioned and therefore the 
customary extra-judicial uadimonium is being used36).  As already discussed, 
<147> the current view would not allow this argument from silence.  To the 
contrary, it is difficult to fit these uadimonia within the current view.  One 
would have to conclude that the parties brought themselves to a meeting place 
by single or mutual uadimonia, but then did not complete the procedure by 
using the in ius uocatio, or used the in ius uocatio, but then did not use the 
compulsory Vertagungsuadimonium, preferring instead to use repeated 
voluntary uadimonia followed by in ius uocationes.  The first alternative 
seems the more possible, except that a series of such appointments are 
tantamount to private meetings, and Cicero has told us expressly that Naeuius 
and Quinctius had by this time given up their attempts to settle the matter 
privately (Res conuenire nullo modo poterat, 5. 21), whereupon res esse in 
uadimonium coepit, 5. 2237). 
 
36) See H e f f t e r  (note 28) 276 n.4; v o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 199; 
G r e e n i d g e  533; V. A r a n g i o - R u i z (ed.), 'Per Publio Quinzio', in Marco Tullio 
Cicerone. Le Orazioni I (Arnoldo Mondadori, 1964) 15; F u h r m a n n (note 28) 54. <147> 
37) See F. K n i e p, Gai Institutionum Commentarius Tertius (Jena 1914) 166, who takes 
res esse in uadimonium coepit as an express indication that the matter has come before a 
tribunal; also, K a r l o w a  364–5, who argues that Cicero is describing a series of three-day 
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 There is an additional reason for supposing that the purported uadimonium 
for Quinctius' appearance, which Naeuius alleges was made on 5 February, 
and from which the lawsuit itself derived, was not an extra-judicial 
uadimonium.  W o l f has pointed out that this uadimonium and the edict under 
which Naeuius obtained possession must be reconciled with the current view 
of the extra-judicial uadimonium.  The difficulty Wolf identifies arises from 
the fact that a failure to appear to an extra-judicial uadimonium must have 
somehow warranted the relief Naeuius was able to secure.  Wolf resolves the 
difficulty by reconsidering the basis for Naeuius' relief.  The discussion below 
suggests that the difficulty is more easily resolved if the purported 
uadimonium is not extra-judicial. <148> 
 Cicero devotes much of his defence to the argument that Quinctius' 
property was not possessed in accordance with various parts of the edict on 
possession of goods (19. 60 - 27. 85)38), his aim being to show that none of the 
conditions for such possession existed.  He briefly argues (19. 60, with 
recapitulation at 27. 85 and 28. 86) that Quinctius was not one 'qui 
fraudationis causa latitabit'39), but he addresses most of his arguments here to 
the proposition that Quinctius was indeed defended in his absence by Alfenus.  
It is a matter of dispute whether fraudulently concealing oneself, and being 
absent and undefended, were part of the same edict or were independent 
grounds for ordering possession of the debtor's property40).  But Alfenus' 
 
uadimonia which take place in iure (discussed below, notes 107 to 125 and accompanying 
text).  That the suit, once before the praetor, proceeded in such a halting fashion may be 
explained by Naeuius' motives.  We know that Naeuius preferred to sue on a missed 
uadimonium rather than on the merits.  From this we might infer that he was not satisfied with 
the kind of trial—or with the prospect of proving his case at trial—which the early 
negotiations offered to him.  Two factors may have made his position difficult.  First, it may 
have been uncertain at the time the negotiations took place whether he and Quinctius had been 
in a partnership.  Cicero criticises Naeuius for proceeding against a partner who did not appear 
to his uadimonium (15. 48; 16. 52), and makes reference to subsequent transactions which 
might suggest a subsisting partnership (23. 74; 24. 76; 29. 88).  Second, Quinctius himself 
seems to have had outstanding claims against Naeuius, 13. 44 ('quod peto satis det'); 22. 74 
('Naeuius ... cum ipse ultro deberet'); 28.85 ('si quid [Quinctius] peteret'), and this may have 
made Naeuius' prospects at a trial on the merits uncertain. <148> 
38) See L e n e l  tit. 38. 
39) See K a s e r/H a c k l  222; L e n e l  415. 
40) For the proposition that they are independent grounds, see A. F l i n i a u x, Les effets 
de la simple absence, in Études d'histoire juridique offertes à P.F. Girard I (Paris 1913; repr. 
Aalen 1981) 51–6; L e n e l  415 n.13; F. d e  Z u l u e t a (ed.), The Institutes of Gaius I 
(Oxford 1946) 174 n.2; A. G o m e z - I g l e s i a s  C a s a l, Citación y comparecencia en el 
procedimiento formulario romano (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela 1984) 154; 
K a s e r/H a c k l  222–3.  For the proposition that they are not independent, see B. K ü b l e r, 
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defence of Quinctius in his absence, regardless of its relationship in law to the 
issue of fraudulent self-concealment, is an issue which Cicero vigorously sets 
out to prove. 
 It is here that Wolf argues that the issue of Quinctius' absence and Alfenus' 
defence must fit within the current view of the extra-judicial uadimonium.  
Under the current view, Quinctius was (allegedly) bound to make himself 
available at a convenient site (tabula Sextia) from which he could be in ius 
uocatus.  The praetor Burrienus appears to have allowed the possession of 
Quinctius' property on a showing, at least in part, that Quinctius was absent 
and undefended41).  The difficulty is that Quinctius was not bound to appear 
i n  i u r e, nor (if his promise was extra-judicial) was he ordered by the 
praetor to appear, nor was he in ius uocatus, and therefore the notion that his 
property could be possessed and a sale advertised on the <149> ground of 
'absence' seems impossible.  Wolf resolves the difficulty by suggesting that the 
issue Cicero sets out to prove is not that Quinctius was n e v e r absent and 
undefended, but that Quinctius was defended a f t e r possession was granted, 
during the subsequent period of thirty days: 'Die Vermögensbeschalgnahme 
wäre aufgehoben worden oder hinfällig gewesen, wenn vor Ablauf der 
Proskriptionsfrist von 30 Tagen die Defension durch Quinctius selbst oder 
einen Dritten aufgenommen worden wäre.'42) 
 Is it really irrelevant whether Quinctius was defended before the order to 
possess was granted?  It is certainly true that Alfenus undertook his defence of 
Quinctius after the order to possess was granted43), and that his defence during 
the thirty days after the order is a matter that Cicero carefully addresses.  The 
issue is whether we should equate Cicero's argument with a proposition that 
would genuinely permit relief under the law, or conclude that Cicero is simply 
 
Der Process des Quinctius und C. Aquilius Gallus, SZ 14 (1893) 63–5; Roby  II (note 31) 
471–4.  Perhaps the best evidence for this proposition is G. 3. 78: Bona autem ueneunt aut 
uiuorum aut mortuorum: uiuorum ueluti eorum qui fraudationis causa latitant nec absentes 
defenduntur.  'Absence' refers to absence in iure.  See authorities cited in K a s e r/H a c k l  
223 n.24, and I. B u t i, Il "praetor" e le formalità introduttive del processo formulare 
(Camerino, 1984) 275.  If 'absent and undefended' are independent grounds for possession of 
goods, there must have been other conditions for possession which are not apparent in the 
sources. 
41) Cf. W o l f  66 n.30, who argues that possession was granted on grounds of 
fraudulent concealment, and not on grounds of 'absent and undefended'. <149> 
42) W o l f  66 n.30.  Cf. G r e e n i d g e  535–6: 'It is clear that this defence did not 
invalidate Burrienus' action.  It came too late.  It followed the missio in possessionem and, at 
the time of the issue of the writ, Quinctius was undefended.' 
43) His defence, according to Cicero, began with the tearing down of the notices for sale.  
19. 61. 
18 E. Metzger IusCivile.com 
 
giving the best argument he can under the circumstances44).  Admittedly, 
whether Quinctius ought to have been defended before possession was ordered 
by Burrienus could be answered with certainty only with knowledge of the 
specific edictal rules under which possession was permitted.  But it seems 
likely.  Cicero raises the matter of Alfenus' defence of Quinctius in the course 
of arguing a specific proposition: 'ex edicto praetoris bona P. Quincti possideri 
nullo modo potuisse' (19. 60) 45).  He does not argue (or concede) that 
possession of Quinctius' goods was proper when it was ordered.  Nor does he 
argue, as Wolf's interpretation <150> suggests he might, that the conditions 
for permitting a sale after the prescribed thirty days were not satisfied (no sale 
ever took place, 23. 73; 24. 76; 29. 88)46).  He is simply arguing, on his own 
statement, that one of the possible grounds for possession under the edict did 
not exist, because Quinctius was, as it were, defended as ably as possible47).  
One suspects he is avoiding the proper argument, that Quinctius was defended 
simpliciter, and substituting the argument that Quinctius was defended from 
the earliest possible moment (19. 60, 61).  The argument suggests that Alfenus 
is vulnerable to the charge that he did not defend as early as he ought to have.  
 
44) A r a n g i o - R u i z, for example, appears to take Cicero at his word, suggesting that 
when Naeuius recognized Alfenus as representative, this in some way 'cured' the lack of 
representation at the crucial moment when Quinctius purportedly failed to appear to his 
uadimonium.  A r a n g i o - R u i z  (note 36) 23.  Yet Alfenus appears to have been 
recognised as Quinctius' procurator much earlier, before Quinctius left Rome; see 5. 21. 
45) This is the second of a three-part argument.  Cicero puts his principal argument that 
Naeuius did not properly maintain possession in the missing third part of his argument, see 29. 
89, 90; Severianus, Praecepta Artis Rhetoricae 16 (ed. A. L. C a s t e l l i M o n t a n a r i, 
Bologna 1995, 101–3).  This is where one would expect to find W o l f ' s proposition.  In 
support of W o l f ' s argument, however, one should note that Cicero includes some 
arguments for 'improper maintaining of possession' at the end of part two (27. 84, 85). <150> 
46) See F l i n i a u x  (note 40) 59: '... si, pendant le délai de trente jours, l'absent n'était 
pas revenu se défendre ou n'avait pas été défendu par un représentant, faire procéder à la 
uenditio bonorum.'  
47) This part of the text (19. 60), where Cicero apparently turns to that part of the edict 
QUI ABSENS IUDICIO DEFENSUS NON FUERIT, is found in no extant manuscript and 
was supplied by early editors who declared they had seen it somewhere.  See L e n e l 415 
n.13.  It is clear, at least, that something must be supplied here which will introduce Cicero's 
argument that want of defence did not warrant possession of Quinctius' goods.  But the details 
are unknown.  As discussed above, most suggestions adhere to the view that the edict that is 
treated here followed on from, or formed part of, the edict QUI FRAUDATIONIS CAUSA 
etc.  See R o b y  II (note 31) 471–4.  On the other hand, there is no reason to exclude the 
possibility that Cicero is addressing something that fell elsewhere in the edict.  K ü b l e r 
raises the possibility that Quinctius' goods were possessed because he gave a uindex and then 
did not appear, see Ulpian (5 ed.) D. 42, 4, 2 pr. (ignoring interpolation), but admits we simply 
do not have enough information.  K ü b l e r  (note 40) 58. <151> 
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As the issue is whether possession was warranted on grounds of 'want of 
defence', we might suspect that Alfenus could have begun his defence before 
the order for possession was granted. 
 If Quinctius' goods were possessed because he was absent and undefended, 
then his missed uadimonium could not have been an extra-judicial 
uadimonium.  It would be incongruous for a praetor to adjudge as absent and 
undefended, and order possession and sale of the property of, a person who 
was never ordered by the praetor to appear, who was never uocatus, and 
whose only offence was to have been bound to appear in the forum and not to 
have done so.  But indeed the problem does not arise: the very reason for 
treating Quinctius' purported promise to appear as an extra-judicial 
uadimonium (no mention of in ius uocatio) disappeared with the discovery of 
the Herculaneum and Puteoli tablets.  And if the missed uadimonium was 
judicial, there is nothing incongruous in the order to possess. <151> 
ii)  first uadimonium by Alfenus as procurator (19. 61; cf. 20. 63) 
Videamus quae deinde sint consecuta.  Hominem P. Quincti deprehendis in publico, 
conaris abducere; non patitur Alfenus, ui tibi adimit, curat ut domum reducatur ad 
Quinctium.  Hic quoque summe constat procuratoris diligentis officium.  Debere tibi dicis 
Quinctium, procurator negat; uadari uis, promittit; in ius uocas, sequitur; iudicium 
postulas, non recusat. 
Let us see what happened next.  You seize a slave, in public, belonging to P. Quinctius, 
and try to take him away; Alfenus does not allow it, takes him from you by force, sees to 
it that he is taken back to Quinctius' house.  Here also the performance of a diligent 
procurator is perfectly demonstrated.  You say that Quinctius is in debt to you, the 
procurator denies it; you wish him to promise a uadimonium to you, he promises; you 
summon him in ius, he follows; you ask for a trial, he does not refuse. 
 As part of his claim that Quinctius' goods were not possessed in 
accordance with the edict, Cicero argues here that Quinctius was defended in 
his absence by Alfenus, and praises several of Alfenus' acts individually.  
Cicero appears to describe these acts in chronological order ('Videamus, quae 
deinde sint consecuta.').  In describing these acts, uadari uis precedes in ius 
uocas, and therefore this might appear to be an instance in which a 
uadimonium has been employed before a case has commenced. 
 Although this passage is often cited as evidence for the extra-judicial 
uadimonium, it has been cited for two very different propositions.  On the 
earlier views of the extra-judicial uadimonium, it will be remembered, the 
extra-judicial uadimonium was believed to have replaced the in ius uocatio, 
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and (on those views) one would therefore not find the two institutions 
together, referring to the same court appearance.  Accordingly v o n  
B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g, in defending the idea that Cicero nowhere refers 
to the in ius uocatio (thus demonstrating the prevalence of the extra-judicial 
uadimonium), argues that Alfenus as procurator could not be the object of a 
genuine, compulsory in ius uocatio48).  On the earlier views, therefore, this 
passage is significant for the fact that a summons has been effected by a 
uadimonium alone. 
 On the current view of the extra-judicial uadimonium, however, this 
passage is significant for a different reason: it serves as an example of the 
uadimonium and the in ius uocatio working in concert with one another49). 
<152> This interpretation of the passage, unlike the one it replaced, depends 
on the assumption that Alfenus' promise to appear and the in ius uocatio which 
summoned him are associated with the same court appearance.  Since this 
passage, on this assumption, would provide the sole surviving evidence of the 
two institutions working in concert, the proposition that they do indeed refer to 
the same appearance must be considered carefully. 
 The disagreement between Naeuius and Quinctius created two 
controversies.  The first controversy concerned the debts the parties might or 
might not owe to one another.  The second controversy concerned Quinctius' 
missed uadimonium and Naeuius' possession of Quinctius' goods under the 
edict.  Although Cicero's speech is largely about the second controversy, he 
mentions the first controversy frequently.  He speaks about the parties' 
difficulty in settling their debts before Quinctius left Rome (5. 22), how the 
present proceedings were born of Naeuius' preference for a complicated legal 
proceeding rather than a pecuniarium iudicium (28. 85), how Naeuius may 
have owed money to Quinctius50), and how Quinctius stood ready to go to trial 
on the real issues (13. 42 - 44).  The debt controversy nearly came to 
litigation; the debts were the subject of repeated meetings in iure (5. 22; 6. 
23), and in the sequence of events under discussion Cicero says to Naeuius 
'Debere tibi dicis Quinctium, procurator negat'51). 
 This exchange between the parties to the debt immediately precedes the 
disputed uadimonium.  The issue is whether the uadimonium is in some way 
related to this exchange or, as some believe, is related to the in ius uocatio that 
follows it.  The exchange itself appears to be an allusion to the notice of a 
 
48) V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 199 n. 17. 
49) W o l f  65 n. 29. <152> 
50) See passages cited above note 37. 
51) Cf. also 13. 44: Pecuniam petit; negamus deberi.  See note 34 above. 
21 E. Metzger IusCivile.com 
 
claim (editio actionis) that a claimant gives to his adversary prior to or at the 
time of summons52).  So far as we are informed, the notice was an act which 
served to notify the party to be sued of the action for which he should 
prepare53).  The party giving notice was also required to make known to his 
adversary the evidence on which he intended to rely at trial (editio 
instrumentorum)54).  One of the aims of these rules was to inform the 
defendant and thereby lessen the need for a postponement in <153> iure55).  
But where the summons followed immediately on the editio, such that the 
defendant had an insufficient opportunity to consider his defence, the need for 
a postponement notwithstanding the editio is evident56). 
 This suggests the possibility that the cited uadimonium was a judicial 
uadimonium and was not associated with the in ius uocatio that followed it.  
Alfenus denies the debt and wins a delay before the praetor in the debt 
controversy, perhaps by insisting that Naeuius present proof of what was 
owing, or by requesting time to consider a defence, or by arguing, as Alfenus 
did indeed argue57), that it would be more just if Naeuius waited until 
Quinctius returned to Rome.  Naeuius then becomes impatient with the delays 
in the debt controversy, decides to pursue the second controversy—Quinctius' 
missed uadimonium—and summons Alfenus to give security58). 
 
52) A.-J. B o y é, Pro Petronia Iusta, in Mélanges Lévy-Bruhl (Paris 1959) 40 n. 2. 
53) Ulpian (4 ed.) D. 2, 13, 1 pr.: Qua quisque actione agere uolet, eam edere debet: nam 
aequissimum uidetur eum qui acturus est edere actionem, ut proinde sciat reus, utrum cedere 
an contendere ultra debeat ....  See L e n e l § 9 and especially B ü r g e (note 17).  Cicero 
subsequently refers to Naeuius' editio at 20. 63 and 21. 66. 
54) Ulpian (4 ed.) D. 2, 13, 1, 3; B ü r g e  (note 17) 25–41. <153> 
55) A. F e r n a n d e z  B a r r e i r o, La previa informacion del adversario en el proceso 
privado romano (Pamplona 1969) 41–3; B u t i  (note 40) 298. 
56) F e r n a n d e z  B a r r e i r o (note 55) 38–9; B u t i  (note 40) 199–200.  
Postponement may also have been allowed to permit the claimant himself to bring forward 
further evidence supporting the action he intended to bring.  This is suggested by Ulpian (4 
ed.) D. 2. 13. 1. 5: Eis, qui ob aetatem uel rusticitatem uel ob sexum lapsi non ediderunt uel 
alia iusta causa, subuenietur.  'Other sufficient ground' ought to include cases in which 
evidence is not immediately available for production.  B ü r g e rightly points out that new 
evidence would not be brought forward after the contents of the formula are determined, 
B ü r g e  (note 17) 36–7, but before that instant there was room for the praetor to extend the 
protections he saw fit. 
57) In an earlier part of the speech (6. 27) Cicero mentions that Alfenus, after tearing 
down the notices, carrying back the slave, and declaring himself Quinctius' agent, denuntiat ... 
istum aequum esse famae fortunisque P. Quincti consulere et aduentum eius exspectare; quod 
si facere nolit atque imbiberit eius modi rationibus illum ad suas condiciones perducere, sese 
nihil precari et, si quid agere uelit, iudicio defendere.  This was perhaps the argument on 
which Alfenus won a delay in the partnership suit. 
58) He may have sought from Alfenus the security that a procurator for a defendant is 
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 One should ask why this explanation is preferable to the explanation that 
relates the uadimonium and the in ius uocatio to the same court appearance.  
The answer is that, under the latter explanation, Alfenus is not being the good 
procurator Cicero claims him to be.  Alfenus, we would understand, had 
actively defended Quinctius in tearing down sale notices and taking back a 
seized slave, but then, instead of seeking relief from the praetor, has waited for 
Naeuius to demand bail and summon him.  It would be odd for Alfenus <154> 
suddenly to abandon the initiative, and also odd (if it were true) for Cicero to 
take the trouble to mention it.  Cicero would be praising Alfenus for coming to 
the praetor only on threat of a penalty, and singling out for praise ('in ius 
uocas, sequitur') the act of walking a few metres to the praetor's tribunal.  It is 
more likely that Alfenus has approached the praetor of his own volition.  Quite 
apart from Alfenus' obvious zeal, it is in Alfenus' interest to contest the grant 
of possession, and manifestly not in Naeuius' interest to give Alfenus that 
opportunity.  Accordingly the uadimonium marks the conclusion of the first 
proceeding, while the in ius uocatio marks Naeuius' decision to pursue a new 
course that promises him quicker relief.  On this interpretation Cicero's 
arguments in the quoted passage are more cogent: he is praising Alfenus for 
defending against the debt claim, for promising to reappear so the claim could 
be further explored, for obeying the summons (that is, not secreting himself or 
giving a uindex) when Naeuius decided to change tack, and for acceding 
(though belatedly) to the form of action of which Naeuius had earlier given 
him notice. 
iii)  second uadimonium by Alfenus as procurator (7. 29; cf. 21. 67) 
Iste postulabat ut procurator iudicatum solui satis daret; negat Alfenus aequum esse 
procuratorem satis dare, quod reus satis dare non deberet, si ipse adesset.  Appellantur 
tribuni; a quibus cum esset certum auxilium petitum, ita tum disceditur ut Idibus 
Septembribus P. Quinctium sisti Sex. Alfenus promitteret. 
[Naeuius] requests that the procurator give security for potential payment of the 
judgment; Alfenus says that it is not fair for a procurator to give security where the 
defendant himself, were he present, would not have to give it.  He appeals to the tribunes, 
and after he had sought particular relief from them the parties then went away, after 
Alfenus had promised that Quinctius would be present on 13 September. 
 
obliged to give (see the sources cited below note 60), or perhaps had been waiting for thirty 
days after possession in order to seek from Alfenus the security which Quinctius was obliged 
to give him.  On the latter possibility see A r a n g i o - R u i z  (note 36) 23–4 & n. 18. <154> 
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 This passage is only occasionally cited59) as an instance of the extra-
judicial uadimonium, perhaps because it is not a uadimonium that introduces a 
lawsuit.  It is indeed a uadimonium that evades any simple classification.  
Naeuius wishes Alfenus to give security pending the outcome of the case, and 
the praetor indicates that he would consider making an order to this effect (19. 
63).  Alfenus' appeal to the tribunes is not successful, resulting only in the 
tribune Brutus recommending that Alfenus and Naeuius come to some 
agreement (20. 65).  Alfenus asks Naeuius not to act in Quinctius' absence, but 
says that if Naeuius persists (sin autem inimicissime atque infestissime 
contendere perseueret, 21. 66), Alfenus will defend.  However, Alfenus then 
promises a uadimonium for Quinctius' appearance. <155> 
 We presume that nothing, except the intervention of the tribune, would 
have legally prevented Naeuius from pursuing Alfenus for the security which 
a procurator must provide60), and from there proceeding against Alfenus as 
Quinctius' procurator.  Naeuius has decided to leave the procurator alone and 
go against the principal61); perhaps this was his own decision or (more likely) 
was the agreement recommended by Brutus.  Of course it would not reflect 
well on Alfenus' 'defence' if he avoided his responsibilities as procurator by 
promising that his principal would appear, and understandably Cicero 
emphasises Alfenus' reluctance to follow this course. 
 The uadimonium Alfenus uses to bring his principal to court is not an 
extra-judicial uadimonium.  It does not introduce a lawsuit, and however much 
it is 'voluntary' on Alfenus' part, it is not voluntary on Quinctius' part.  Cicero 
does not say whether the praetor compelled Alfenus to make his promise, 
though perhaps the threat of being compelled to do so (that is, the uadimonium 
being Alfenus' 'voluntary' act only in the loosest sense of the word) makes the 
point moot.  Alfenus' uadimonium can therefore be described as 'extra-judicial' 
only by altering the definition; Fliniaux comments on this passage as follows: 
'Il s'agit là d'un uadimonium extrajudiciaire, c'est-à-dire d'un uadimonium qui 
servait à assurer pour la première fois la comparution d'un défendeur in 
jure.'62).  There is of course no dispute that a procurator who has appeared in 
iure can promise the appearance of his principal. 
 
59) It is so cited by S t e i n w e n t e r  2057 and F l i n i a u x  65. <155> 
60) See G. 4. 101; Ulpian (60 ed.) D. 3, 3, 51, 2, h. t. 53. 
61) On the unlikely suggestion that Alfenus had already accepted a iudicium, maintained 
by W l a s s a k and J a h r, see W o l f  (note 31) 15–20. 
62) F l i n i a u x  65 n. 3. 
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b)  uadimonia to other tribunals, in Cicero 
 The uadimonium in which a person promises to appear at a remote tribunal 
('Verweisungsuadimonium') is usually included among 'judicial uadimonia' 
and not 'extra-judicial uadimonia'63).  This classification, however, assumes 
that the promise to appear at the remote tribunal is ordered by a magistrate, in 
the same way that an ordinary 'Vertagungsuadimonium' is ordered.  Yet the 
classification may not hold where a uadimonium to a <156> remote tribunal 
has been promised voluntarily.  Some uadimonia of this kind have been 
classed as extra-judicial on this assumption64), and two of these are from 
Cicero. 
 The first is a comment on Verres' administration of justice as praetor (II in 
Verrem 5. 34): 
... unum illud, quod ita fuit illustre notumque omnibus ut nemo tam rusticanus homo L. 
Lucullo M. Cotta consulibus Romam ex ullo municipio uadimonii causa uenerit, quin 
sciret iura omnia praetoris urbani nutu atque arbitrio Chelidonis meretriculae gubernari .... 
... this one fact was so obvious and so well known to everyone, that during the consulship 
of L. Lucullus and M. Cotta, any rube coming to Rome from some municipium for the 
sake of a uadimonium knew that the justice administered by the urban praetor was 
determined entirely by the will and whim of Chelidon the prostitute .... 
The uadimonium in this passage has been cited by v o n  B e t h m a n n - 
H o l l w e g and some subsequent writers as an instance of the extra-judicial 
uadimonium65).  That it might indeed be such an instance is beyond argument; 
 
63) See S t e i n w e n t e r  2056–7; W. S i m s h ä u s e r, Stadtrömisches 
Verfahrensrecht im Spiegel der lex Irnitana, SZ 109 (1992) 166; and the discussion at 
D o m i n g o  II (note 4) 54–8, and (note 6) 178–80.  The classification is not significantly 
different in W e n g e r  90–1, who classifies the uadimonium by which a magistrate orders a 
reappearance 'eigentliches Dilationsvadimonien', and the uadimonium by which a magistrate 
transfers the matter to another with greater, equal, or lesser jurisdiction, 'uneigentliches 
Dilationsvadimonien'. <156> 
64) For example, three of the uadimonia Romam from Herculaneum have been classed as 
voluntary on the argument that they lack any reference to a magistral decretum.  See below 
notes 86 to 88 and accompanying text. 
65) V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 200 n.24 (citing this passage as evidence for 
both the voluntary and compulsory uadimonium).  He also cites this passage for the 
proposition that parties could forgo having their case heard at the local level and voluntarily 
bring it to Rome instead.  V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 24.  See also 
K a s e r/H a c k l  231 n. 37; S t e i n w e n t e r  2057.  Cf. A. H. J. G r e e n i d g e, Roman 
Public Life (London 1901) 313, citing this passage for the proposition that 'The defendant 
[was] in some cases compelled to give bail (uadimonium) to bring his case to Rome.'  
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the ability of a person voluntarily to promise his appearance in Rome is not in 
doubt66).  The alternative is that Cicero's rusticanus comes to Rome because 
he was ordered (or stipulated to another) to appear, or could have been so 
ordered and chose to make the promise without awaiting an order to do so67).  
Cicero gives no obvious indication which of these uadimonia—voluntary or 
involuntary—he is referring to, nor whether the distinction is even 
important68).  If the passage is to support the argument that <157> the extra-
judicial uadimonium was common in the late Republic, we must have some 
evidence that the uadimonium Cicero speaks of is indeed voluntary, and it is 
reasonable to ask what evidence there is. 
 The present state of the evidence on uadimonia to remote tribunals is 
considerably better than in von Bethmann-Hollweg's day.  At the time he 
presented this passage as one of the 'innumerable examples' of the voluntary 
uadimonium in Cicero, the lex de Gallia Cisalpina had already shown that, 
within Italy in the late Republic, jurisdictional competence could be divided 
between a local court and Rome, and that where local competence was 
exceeded a defendant could be compelled to provide a 
Verweisungsuadimonium to Rome69).  The subsequent discovery of the Este 
fragment70) confirmed the scheme of divided jurisdiction for roughly the same 
period, though a provision on uadimonium to Rome, comparable to that in the 
 
Similarly, F l i n i a u x  117. 
66) W. S i m s h ä u s e r, Iuridici und Munizipalgerichtsbarkeit in Italien (Munich 1973) 
190.  See also K a r l o w a  332–3. 
67) It is only a terminological point whether to class as 'extra-judicial' a colourably extra-
judicial uadimonium promised by a litigant who knows that his opponent's case exceeds local 
competence and chooses to make his promise without making a first appearance locally, as 
described in Paul (1 ed.) D. 2, 5, 2 pr., quoted below, note 73. 
68) My own belief, based only on the tenor of Cicero's argument, is that he would <157> 
not have spoiled his remark by suggesting that litigants coming to Rome were willing to 
overlook the quality of justice administered by the urban praetor. 
69) See lex de Gallia Cisalpina, col. 2, ll. 21–4: quo minus in eum, quei ita uadimonium 
Romam ex decreto eius, quei ibei i(ure) d(eicundo) p(raerit), non promeisserit aut uindicem 
locupletem ita non dederit, ob e(am) r(em) iudicium recup(eratorium) is, quei ibei i(ure) 
d(eicundo) p(raerit), ex h(ac) l(ege) det iudicareique d(e) e(a) r(e) ibei curet, ex h(ac) l(ege) 
n(ihilum) r(ogatur) (text of RS I, no. 28, p. 466).  This provision was probably employed 
where the matter was worth more than 15,000 sesterces.  F. J. B r u n a, Lex Rubria (Leiden 
1972) 165; W. S i m s h ä u s e r, SZ 93 (1976) 391.  On the relation between this statute and 
judicial administration in Italy, see A. L i n t o t t, Imperium Romanum. Politics and 
Administration (London 1993) 67–8, 136–7.  G r e e n i d g e regarded the existence of this 
statute alone as a sufficient refutation of v o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g ' s interpretation. 
G r e e n i d g e  102. 
70) RS I, no. 16. 
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lex de Gallia Cisalpina, does not survive in the fragment.  Other sources now 
attest the use of compulsory uadimonia to other tribunals (whether to Rome or 
to a provincial governor) outside Italy during the Republic71).  And the lex 
<158> Irnitana, though of course much later than the Cicero passage and in 
the nature of a charter, appears to reflect a republican model72), insofar as it 
permits a local magistrate to exact a promise of a uadimonium for appearance 
before the provincial governor even in cases in which the magistrate otherwise 
had no jurisdiction73).  Quite apart from new evidence, the compulsory 
 
71) From Claros there is an inscription, from perhaps the 2nd century B.C, praising its 
ambassador Menippos for securing freedom from compulsory uadimonia, see Décret pour 
Ménippos, col. I, ll. 23–7, in L. & J. R o b e r t (edd.), Claros I. Décrets Hellénistiques (Paris 
1989) 63–4: τῶν παραγινοµένων εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν τὰ κριτήρια µεταγόντων ἀπὸ τῶν 
νόµων ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐξουσίαν καὶ πρὸς µέρος ἀεὶ τῶν ἐνκαλουµένων πολιτῶν 
ἐγγύας ἀνανκαζοµένων ὑποµένειν ....; ll. 37–9: τοὺς δὲ κατοικοῦντας τὴν πόλιν 
ἐλευθέρωσε κατεγγυήσεων καὶ στρατηγικῆς ἐξουσίας ....  On the import of this decree, 
see Lintott (note 69) 39, 62, 66.  See also the SC de Aphrodisiensibus, ll. 47–8, in J. 
R e y n o l d s, Aphrodisias and Rome (Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies, Journal 
of Roman Studies Monographs No. 1) (London 1982) 59, from the late 1st century B.C., 
forbidding within Plarasa and Aphrodisias the accepting or ordering of uadimonia to Rome: µήτε ἐνγύην ε[ἰς Ῥώµην ἔντος τ]ῶν ὅρων ἐκείνων τινα  <158> ὁµολ[ο]γεῖν τινι ἢ [κ]αὶ κελεύειν ὁµολογεῖν ....; and SEG 18 (1962), no. 555 ('Letter of Vinicius'), ll. 20–2, 
from perhaps 27 B.C., in J. A C r o o k, An Augustan Inscription in the Rijksmuseum at 
Leyden, Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. (n.s.) 8 (1962) 23–4, 29, which advises the magistrates at 
Cyme that one Lysias must accept a price for a sanctuary he presently owns, or else make a 
uadimonium for appearance before the governor of Asia: sei autem Lusia contradeicit quae 
Apollonides posuit et uadimonium ei satisdato ubi ego ero Lusiam promittere uoltis, +vacat+ 
probo.  (The text given here is much reconstructed; cf. R. K. S h e r k, Roman Documents 
from the Greek East, Baltimore, MD, 1969, 314, and K u n k e l, note 9, 212–13.)  A fragment 
from the lex Coloniae Genetiuae (fr. 5; see RS I, pp. 411–12) appears to refer to a 
uadimonium for appearance before the provincial governor, but the compulsory character is 
not apparent. 
72) K. H a c k l, Der Zivilprozeß des frühen Prinzipats in den Provinzen, SZ 114 (1997) 
146–7.  It certainly reflects the lex de Gallia Cisalpina in this respect, and perhaps also the lex 
Coloniae Genetiuae, cited above note 71. 
73) Lex Irni. c. 84, ll. 20–3: (granting the duumuiri jurisdiction) omnium rerum 
[dumtaxa]t de uadimonio promittendo in eum [locum in] quo is erit qui [e]i prouinciae praerit 
futurusue esse uidebitur eo die in quem ut uadimonium promittatur postulabitur, ....  In 
D o m i n g o II (note 4) 57–8 and (note 6) 179 n. 29, the author suggests that there is an 
indirect reference to uadimonia to other tribunals at ll. 40–2 of chapter K (= c. 49) of the lex 
Irnitana.  On the magistrate's power to grant a uadimonium in matters otherwise beyond his 
jurisdiction, see A. R o d g e r, The Jurisdiction of Local Magistrates: Chapter 84 of the lex 
Irnitana, ZPE 84 (1990) 150; S i m s h ä u s e r  (note 63) 166.  The clearest juristic text is Paul 
(1 ed.) D. 2, 5, 2 pr.: Ex quacumque causa ad praetorem uel alios, qui iurisdictioni praesunt, 
in ius uocatus uenire debet, ut hoc ipsum sciatur, an iurisdictio eius sit.  This rule may apply 
27 E. Metzger IusCivile.com 
 
character of the uadimonium to Rome treated in the edict is quite clear from its 
place near the beginning of the edict; Lenel argued that this was an indication 
that a local magistrate would transfer a case beyond his jurisdiction to a higher 
tribunal74). <159> 
 None of this evidence, of course, excludes the possibility that the cited 
uadimonium was voluntary.  But given the well-attested use of compulsory 
uadimonia in the very context Cicero describes, one might ask what grounds 
exist to treat the cited uadimonium as voluntary.  If the voluntary character is 
not apparent in some way, the passage cannot give much support to the thesis 
that voluntary uadimonia were common. 
 The second passage, pro Tullio 20, is in a similar posture to the first 
passage.  As with the first passage, it may indeed give an instance of a 
voluntary uadimonium.  But as with the first passage, it does not support a 
thesis about the prevalence of voluntary uadimonia.  Tullius and Fabius 
disagree about the ownership of a piece of land near Thurii.  They meet 
privately; their intention is to engage in an 'expulsion' (deductio moribus), and 
then have the matter resolved by some means at Rome: 
Appellat Fabius ut aut ipse Tullium deduceret aut ab eo deduceretur.  Dicit deducturum se 
Tullius, uadimonium Fabio Romam promissurum. 
Fabius declares that either he should expel Tullius or be expelled by him.  Tullius says 
that he himself will expel, that he will promise Fabius a uadimonium for appearance in 
Rome. 
There is little known, and little consensus, on deductio moribus, an extra-
judicial act whereby two persons engage in a collusive expulsion from 
possession before undertaking judicial proceedings, perhaps a suit on 
ownership, or perhaps an interdictal proceeding75).  It is disappointing, for 
 
to any incompetent magistrate, see K a s e r/H a c k l  179 n.52; cf. D o m i n g o  II (note 4) 
55 n. 138, who suggests that in its uninterpolated state the rule applied only to municipal 
magistrates.  When a matter had been transferred by uadimonium to the provincial governor, 
there was no 'routine' second uadimonium to Rome by the governor.  See G. P. B u r t o n, The 
Lex Irnitana, Ch. 84, the Promise of Vadimonium and the Jurisdiction of Proconsuls, Classical 
Quarterly 46 (1996) 217–21. 
74) L e n e l  (note 15) 35–8; L e n e l  55–6.  See also R o d g e r  (note 16) 163–5; R. 
D o m i n g o, Estudios sobre el primer título del edicto pretorio I (Universidade de Santiago 
de Compostela 1992) 29–30. <159> 
75) It is best attested in the quoted passage, and in the pro Caecina 7. 20; 8. 22; 10. 27; 
11. 32; 32. 95.  For the proposition that it was collusive, see the quoted passage from the pro 
Tullio and pro Caec. 8. 22: ... Caecina ... ad eum fundum profectus est in quo ex conuentu uim 
fieri oportebat.  The Deductio moribus is discussed at length in G. N i c o s i a, Studi sulla 
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purposes of the present discussion, that the procedure to be followed after such 
an expulsion are unknown; neither in the pro Tullio nor in the pro Caecina did 
the parties, in the event, resort to deductio.  We therefore do not know at what 
point in the subsequent proceedings Tullius' promise would have taken place, 
and most importantly, whether a suit of this type could be brought locally, 
with provision for (in the manner of the lex de Gallia Cisalpina) a compulsory 
uadimonium to Rome if the case were beyond local competence.  With an 
answer to these two questions it would be possible to resolve whether Tullius' 
uadimonium was to be judicial or extra-judicial. 
 But for purposes of argument one can accept that this uadimonium is 
voluntary, and yet be left with no support for wider claims about the pre- 
<160> valence of voluntary uadimonia.  This is because this ostensibly 
voluntary uadimonium arises in the course of a patently voluntary, collusive 
lawsuit.  Von Bethmann-Hollweg vastly overstates the case in claiming, on the 
basis of this passage, that lawsuits within Italy were frequently transferred to 
Rome voluntarily76).  A collusive promise in a collusive lawsuit cannot stand 
for such a proposition.  The passage attests something much more modest: (1) 
that a person could promise his appearance voluntarily, a proposition that was 
never in doubt, and (2) that a person who willingly engaged in a collusive 
proceeding might willingly collude in a uadimonium as well. 
IV.  Documentary Evidence 
Herculaneum uadimonia77) 
TH 6, late 1st Cent. AD 
TH 13, AD 75 
TH 14, AD 75 
TH 15, AD 75 or 76 
 
'deiectio' (Milan 1965) 31–9, and B. F r i e r, The Rise of the Roman Jurists (Princeton/NJ 
1985) 78–92. <160> 
76) V o n  B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  II 200 ('durch freiwillige Vadimonia wurde die 
Sache häufig aus fernen Gegenden Italiens nach Rom überwiesen.'). 
77) TH 6: A r a n g i o - R u i z, BIDR 53–54 (1948) 396 (= Studi epigrafici e 
papirologici, Naples 1974, 311–12); P u g l i e s e  C a r r a t e l l i, Par. Pass. 1 (1946) 383.  
TH 13: P u g l i e s e  C a r r a t e l l i, Par. Pass. 3 (1948) 168–9 (=L'année épigraphique 1951, 
no. 215).  TH 14: A r a n g i o - R u i z, BIDR 62 (1959) 226–8 (= Studi epigrafici e 
papirologici, Naples 1974, 555–6); P u g l i e s e  C a r r a t e l l i, Par. Pass. 3 (1948) 169–70.  
TH 15: A r a n g i o - R u i z, BIDR 62 (1959) 228–9 (= Studi epigrafici e papirologici, Naples 
1974, 556–7); P u g l i e s e  C a r r a t e l l i, Par. Pass. 3 (1948) 170–1. 
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Puteoli uadimonia78) 
TP Sulp 1 (= TP 1), AD 47  
TP Sulp 1 bis (cf. TP 31), AD 41 or 43-45 
TP Sulp 2 (= TP 32), AD 48 
TP Sulp 3 (= TP 41), AD 48 
TP Sulp 4 (= TP 70 + TP 139), AD 52 
TP Sulp 5 (= TP 36), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 6 (= TP 38), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 7 (= TP 12), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 8 (= TP 2), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 9 (= TP 106), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 10 (= TP 42, TP 93), mid-1st Cent. AD <161> 
TP Sulp 11 (= TP 11), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 12 (cf. TP 116, TP 79), AD 40 or 43-44 
TP Sulp 13 (= TP 3), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 14 (cf. TP 4), mid-1st Cent. AD 
TP Sulp 15 (cf. TP 33), mid-1st Cent. AD 
 The uadimonia from Herculaneum and Puteoli are generally regarded as 
extra-judicial uadimonia79).  They came to be regarded in this way on the basis 
of both internal and external evidence.  The discussion below addresses the 
proposition that all of the documents are extra-judicial uadimonia.  I suggest 
that the grounds for classifying all of the documents in this way have been 
weakened by current scholarship, and that some individual documents, to the 
contrary, are probably judicial uadimonia80). 
 
78) TP Sulp 1: C a m o d e c a  53–4; M a n t h e, Gnomon 53 (1981), 152.  TP Sulp 1 
bis: C a m o d e c a  54–5.  TP Sulp 2: C a m o d e c a  56; M a n t h e, Gnomon 53 (1981) 153.  
TP Sulp 3: C a m o d e c a  56–8; M a n t h e, Gnomon 53 (1981) 154.  TP Sulp 4: 
C a m o d e c a  58–9; B o v e 58.  TP Sulp 5: C a m o d e c a  59–60; G i m é n e z - 
C a n d e l a, Studi Sanfilippo I 187 (= AE 1984, no. 240).  TP Sulp 6: C a m o d e c a  60; 
M a n t h e, Gnomon 53 (1981) 154.  TP Sulp 7: C a m o d e c a  60–1.  TP Sulp 8: 
C a m o d e c a  61–2.  TP Sulp 9: C a m o d e c a  62.  TP Sulp 10: C a m o d e c a  63.  TP 
Sulp 11: C a m o d e c a  64.  TP Sulp 12: C a m o d e c a  64–5.  TP Sulp 13: C a m o d e c a  
66; T r i a n t a p h y l l o p o u l o s, Mélanges hellénique G. Daux (Paris, 1974) 136–8 (= AE 
1974, no. 278).  TP Sulp 14: C a m o d e c a  66–7; T r i a n t a p h y l l o p o u l o s, Mélanges 
hellénique G. Daux (Paris, 1974) 136–8 (= AE 1974, no. 278).  TP Sulp 15: C a m o d e c a  
68–9. <161> 
79) J. G. W o l f, Aus dem neuen pompejanischen Urkundenfund, SDHI 45 (1979) 165 n. 
83; C a m o d e c a 49; P. G r ö s c h l e r, Die tabellae-Urkunden aus den pompejanischen und 
herkulanensischen Urkundenfunden (Berlin 1996) 63 n. 247. 
80) I do not argue that none of the documents are extra-judicial uadimonia. 
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a)  uadimonium factum ei  
 The Herculaneum uadimonia were the first to be treated as extra-judicial.  
Of the four, three (TH 13-15) are part of a series of documents concerning a 
lawsuit over the free-born status of one Petronia Iusta81).  For purposes of 
discussion, a portion of the scriptura interior to TH 15, a uadimonium to Rome 
stipulated by Petronia Iusta (Arangio-Ruiz, 1959, abbreviations resolved), is 
reproduced below. 
Vadimonium factum M. Calatorio Speudonti in IIII Idus Martias primas Romae in foro 
Augusto ante aede Martis Ultoris hora tertia HS M dari stipulata est ea quae se Petroniam 
Spurii filiam Iustam esse dicat spopondit M. Calatorius Speudon. 
All of the uadimonium documents (including those from Puteoli) appear to 
follow this model very closely82).  And as with most of the documents, the 
meaning is fairly plain, even though the syntax is mysterious: a person <162> 
who calls herself Petronia Iusta has stipulated that M. Calatorius Speudon 
should appear in the forum at Rome on 12 March or pay a penalty of 1,000 
sesterces83).  What is not immediately clear is (1) whether this uadimonium 
and the two others in this lawsuit are Verweisungsuadimonia from 
Herculaneum to Rome84), ordered by a magistrate, or simply voluntary 
agreements to appear in Rome (that is, extra-judicial uadimonia), and (2) how 
to explain the syntax.  In presenting these documents A r a n g i o - R u i z 
addressed both of these questions85).  To the first question he suggested that 
the three uadimonia in this lawsuit were extra-judicial, because they did not 
 
81) See V. A r a n g i o - R u i z, Il processo di Giusta, Par. Pass. 3 (1948) 129–51; V. 
A r a n g i o - R u i z, Testi e documenti IV, BIDR 62 (1959) 223–45; J. A. C r o o k, Law and 
Life of Rome (London 1967) 48–50; F. C o s t a b i l e, Nuove luci sul 'processo di Giusta', in 
Studi Sanfilippo VII (Milan 1987) 185–230; P. R. C. W e a v e r, Children of Freedmen (and 
Freedwomen), in B. Rawson (ed.), Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome (Oxford 
1991) 166–90. 
82) See B o v e  63–4; W o l f  66.  An exception to this model is found in TP Sulp 10, 
which in C a m o d e c a ' s edition begins 'Vadimonium cum' and is lacking several elements, 
most conspicuously the stipulation.  C a m o d e c a  suggests persuasively that the text may be 
only a draft.  C a m o d e c a  63. <162> 
83) We do not know from the documents whether she is the plaintiff or the defendant in 
the case, C r o o k  (note 81) 48–9, but in each of the uadimonia in which she appears, she is 
stipulating for another's appearance. 
84) One should note that the Herculaneum uadimonia, unlike many of those from 
Puteoli, do not indicate the place of execution; that they are Verweisungsuadimonia is 
therefore an inference. 
85) His arguments may be found at Par. Pass. 3 (1948) 137–40, and BIDR 62 (1959) 
230–4. 
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make reference to a decretum of the local magistrate86).  He relied on a portion 
of the lex de Gallia Cisalpina87), which refers to the power of a local 
magistrate to order a uadimonium to Rome ex decreto.  He did not attempt to 
classify in this way the remaining Herculaneum uadimonium, TH 6, which is 
not well preserved88). 
 On the second question, regarding syntax, the principal problem is that the 
documents say flatly that one of the parties promises to pay; they do not say 
that he promises to pay in the event he does not appear.  This immediately 
raises a question about the relationship, if any, between the first and second 
parts (in the quoted document, between Vadimonium ... tertia and HS ... 
Speudon).  Arangio-Ruiz suggested that these two halves were distinct 
phrases, and that they represented two acts; that the first phrase was a 
unilateral injunction in which the plaintiff called on the defendant to appear at 
a particular day, place, and time, while the second was the familiar bilateral 
uerborum obligatio, by which the defendant promised to pay a sum, and 
wherein it was implied that the sum was to be paid only if he did not appear.  
For this construction Arangio-Ruiz relied on Gaius' discussion of the judicial 
<163> uadimonium.  With respect to the first proposition, Gaius appears to 
use language similar to that found at the beginning of each tablet (Institutes 
4.184): 
Cum autem in ius uocatus fuerit aduersarius, neque eo die finiri potuerit negotium, 
uadimonium ei faciendum est, id est, ut promittat se certo die sisti. 
However, when the defendant has been called in ius, but matters cannot be completed on 
that day, uadimonium ei faciendum est, that is, that he promises to be present on a 
particular day.  
As with the tablets, according to Arangio-Ruiz, the defendant ('ei') is in the 
dative and the facere is performed by the plaintiff.  With respect to the second 
proposition, Gaius refers to the ability of a person to bind another to appear by 
uadimonium (Institutes 4.187): 
Quas autem personas sine permissu praetoris impune in ius uocare non possumus, easdem 
nec uadimonio inuitas obligare nobis possumus, praeterquam si praetor aditus 
 
86) A r a n g i o - R u i z  (1948) (note 81) 136.  P u g l i e s e  rejects the argument on the 
ground that the documents are sparing with their language and a decree is unnecessary to the 
purpose of a uadimonium.  G. P u g l i e s e, Le "Tabulae Herculanenses" relative al processo 
di Giusta, in Scritti giuridici scelti I (Camerino 1985) 131–2. 
87) Column 2, ll. 21–2, quoted above note 69. 
88) See A r a n g i o - R u i z  (note 36) 33 n. 12. <163> 
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permittat89). 
However, those persons whom we may not with impunity summon in ius without the 
praetor's permission are the same as those whom we may not bind by uadimonium 
against their will, unless the praetor gives his permission. 
This passage, according to Arangio-Ruiz, may be taken to suggest that a 
person may bind another to appear, the obligation being imposed in iure with 
the threat of a magistrate's sanction if the defendant refuses, or imposed extra-
judicially, as in the uadimonium tablets90). 
 Arangio-Ruiz accordingly formulated independent arguments about the 
classification of the uadimonia and the character of the language employed 
therein.  There is nevertheless a close relationship between these arguments: 
the notion of a 'unilateral injunction', plaintiff to defendant, is consistent with 
the way an extra-judicial uadimonium is used.  And Arangio-Ruiz makes note 
of this relationship, commenting that a unilateral injunction is entirely 
appropriate to an institution which historically replaced the patently unilateral 
in ius uocatio91).  Those writing after Arangio-Ruiz on the whole did not agree 
with his construction of the tablets' language92), but many did <164> put 
forward similar interpretations which emphasised the rôle of the plaintiff in 
initiating the uadimonium, e.g., that (1) uadimonium facere expresses an 
unconditional bilateral agreement to appear, created on the invitation of the 
plaintiff93), or that (2) a uadimonium could be either the unilateral act of the 
plaintiff, or a bilateral agreement, or even a combination of the two94), or that 
(3) uadimonium facere expresses an invitation, by the plaintiff to the 
defendant, to make a promise95), or that (4) though uadimonium facere 
 
89) A r a n g i o - R u i z  uses this text, which follows Seckel and Kübler in resolving 
n(obis) possumus. 
90) As B o y é  notes, this is not the strongest of arguments, since it does not follow from 
the statement 'we may not oblige certain persons without the praetor's permission' that 'we 
may indeed oblige any person'.  B o y é  (note 52) 37–8.  But in support of A r a n g i o - 
R u i z, see B u t i (note 40) 317–22. 
91) A r a n g i o - R u i z  (1948) (note 81) 139.  Cf. B o y é  (note 52) 38–40; A.-J. 
B o y é, Replicatio pro Iusta, in Synteleia Arangio-Ruiz (Naples 1964) 1006. 
92) See the literature cited in B o y é (note 52) 35 n. 1; cf. G. P u g l i e s e, L' "actio" e 
<164> la "litis contestatio" nella storia del processo romano, in Scritti giuridici scelti I (Naples 
1985) 429; K u n k e l  (note 9) 212 n.29. 
93) B o y é  (note 52) 36–7; (note 91) 1001–6. 
94) B o v e  34–5. 
95) T. G i m é n e z - C a n d e l a, A propósito del "uadimonium" en las "tabulae 
pompeianae" de Murècine, Studi Sanfilippo I (1982) 186; S. T a f a r o, Fideiussor iudicio 
sistendi causa, Labeo 22 (1976) 240–1. 
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describes the act of the defendant, the reality behind the expression was that a 
plaintiff had invited the defendant to make a uadimonium, and that the 
defendant was obliged to give it96). 
 In this way the Herculaneum and Puteoli uadimonia came to be treated as 
extra-judicial, on the assumption that the initiative of the plaintiff was in some 
way evident in the transaction97).  To be sure, if a uadimonium is extra-
judicial, one expects its language to be consistent with that fact.  But none of 
the interpretations to date attempts to point out any special 'indicia' by which 
all of the Herculaneum and Puteoli uadimonia can be identified as extra-
judicial and not judicial98).  To the contrary, every attempt to discover <165> 
the meaning of uadimonium facere alicui is an attempt to explain the 
expression (1) in the tablets, and (2) in Gaius' discussion of the j u d i c i a l 
uadimonium (G. 4. 184).  W o l f has made this point explicit in offering what 
is perhaps the most persuasive construction of the tablets to date.  He has 
argued that uadimonium factum ei, as it is used in both the tablets and in 
Gaius' discussion of the judicial uadimonium, does not express the plaintiff's 
initiative, but an act of the defendant, in particular that the defendant has 
promised to furnish a stipulation.  And Wolf has brought a great deal of clarity 
to the discussion of the tablets' language by pointing out that 'Das 
Vertagungsvadimonium unterschied sich von dem außergerichtlichen unserer 
Urkunden nach Anlaß und Zweck, nicht aber in seiner Struktur.'99) 
 
96) B u t i  (note 40) 315–22.  For the notion of obligation B u t i  relies, in addition to G. 
4. 187, on Juv. Sat. 3. 297–299 (where I would take the uadimonium facere as a metaphor, see 
note 30 above) and Nep. Timol. 5.2 (uadimonium imponere) which contains, as the author 
acknowledges, a promise to appear by an opponent of Timoleon of Sicily, 4th century B.C. 
97) See e.g. G i m é n e z - C a n d e l a  (note 17) 134 & n. 40: 'Es constante en estos 
documentos la expresiòn uadimonium facere alicui, que testimonia que la iniciativa del 
uadimonium correspondía siempre al demandante.'  C a m o d e c a  also appears to interpret 
the language of the Herculaneum and Puteoli tablets as if it reflected a model for extra-judicial 
uadimonia.  See G. C a m o d e c a, Per una riedizione dell'archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii, 
Puteoli 6 (1982) 23–4; G. C a m o d e c a, Per una riedizione dell'archivio puteolano dei 
Sulpicii, Puteoli 7/8 (1983/1984) 29–30.  But compare Puteoli 6 (1982) 23–4 (suggesting that 
uadimonium factum expresses the initiative of the plaintiff) with C a m o d e c a  49 (accepting 
that uadimonium factum is probably the act of the defendant). 
98) One possible exception is in J. G. W o l f, Aus dem neuen pompejanischen 
Urkundenfund, in Studi Sanfilippo VI (Milan 1985) 787–8, where the author argues that the 
lack of a surety in any of the Herculaneum and Puteoli uadimonia suggests <165> that all are 
extra-judicial.  Yet the lack of a surety would not necessarily indicate an extra-judicial 
uadimonium if, as Gaius says (Inst. 4. 185), the judicial uadimonium was sometimes permitted 
sine satisdatione.  Cf. also W o l f ' s observation, quoted below accompanying note 99, that 
the judicial and extra-judicial uadimonium do not differ from one another in structure. 
99) W o l f  66–9.  Similarly, Wolf  (note 98) 781 n. 35.  His interpretation of the 
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 This does not mean of course that none of the surviving uadimonia tablets 
are extra-judicial; it simply means no one has yet identified a method of 
classifying all of the surviving uadimonia tablets as extra-judicial, and that 
most of the tablets still await classification.  Arangio-Ruiz, it will be recalled, 
identified three of the four Herculaneum uadimonia—apparently 
Verweisungsuadimonia, Herculaneum to Rome—as extra-judicial on the 
negative argument that a Verweisungsuadimonium which is ordered by a 
magistrate would contain a magistrate's decretum, as suggested in the lex de 
Gallia Cisalpina.  Whether one accepts or rejects this argument, one is still 
left to find some means of classifying the remaining Herculaneum 
uadimonium (TH 6), as well as the great majority of the Puteoli tablets, which 
are not Verweisungsuadimonia and on which the lex de Gallia Cisalpina 
therefore gives no guidance. 
b)  provenance 
 There is a further reason why the uadimonia from Puteoli have been 
treated as extra-judicial uadimonia.  The tablets themselves were discovered 
near Pompeii100), suggesting incorrectly that they had been executed in 
Pompeii, and giving rise to the misunderstanding that the lawsuits described 
<166> in the uadimonia were transferred from Pompeii to other tribunals101).  
On this misunderstanding the thesis was put forward that lawsuits transferred 
from Pompeii to Puteoli (identified as the place of appearance in most of the 
uadimonia) must have been done so voluntarily, because compulsory 
Verweisungsuadimonia ordinarily occur where a magistrate with limited 
jurisdiction transfers a suit to a magistrate with greater jurisdiction, and it was 
unlikely that magistrates at Puteoli had greater jurisdiction than those at 
Pompeii102).  With the newer restorations by Camodeca, however, it became 
apparent that nearly every tablet (where the pertinent words were legible) had 
been executed in Puteoli itself, none in Pompeii; the archive had apparently 
 
language in the tablets is accepted by the principal editor of the Puteoli tablets, see 
C a m o d e c a  49. 
100) On the circumstances of the find see C a m o d e c a  11–13. <166> 
101) Specifically, to Puteoli and Rome.  Using the current numbering of the tablets, TP 
Sulp 1–11 are uadimonia for appearance in Puteoli; TP Sulp 13–15, in Rome.  C a m o d e c a  
identifies TP Sulp 12 as a uadimonium for appearance in Capua; this third site was not 
apparent to the early editors.  See C a m o d e c a  64–5. 
102) K u n k e l  (note 9) 210: 'In munizipalen Verhältnissen war diese Art der Ladung 
[das Ladungsuadimonium] sogar die einzig mögliche, sofern es sich um die Einleitung eines 
Prozesses vor einem auswärtigen Gerichtsmagistrat handelte.' 
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been moved from Puteoli to Pompeii for some reason103).  Hence the supposed 
'voluntary Verweisungsuadimonia' were simply promises made in Puteoli for 
appearance in Puteoli, and if the promises were voluntary this would not be 
apparent from their provenance. 
c)  individual uadimonia as judicial uadimonia 
 On some of the Puteoli and Herculaneum uadimonia it is possible to read 
both the date of appearance and the date of execution104), and the span of time 
between these two dates may help to determine whether a given uadimonium 
is a judicial Vertagungsuadimonium and therefore not an extra-judicial 
uadimonium.  This means of identification is possible because a 
Vertagungsuadimonium, under certain conditions, created an interval of three 
days.  The fact that several of the Puteoli uadimonia show an interval of three 
days suggests that these uadimonia are not extra-judicial.  This, in turn, 
suggests that one cannot identify all of the Herculaneum and Puteoli 
uadimonia as extra-judicial on the basis of a common model. <167> 
 Of the six uadimonia that show both relevant dates, the two from 
Herculaneum (TH 14, 15) are for appearance at a remote tribunal, and are 
therefore not Vertagungsuadimonia.  Of the four remaining105), one (TP Sulp 
1) gives the dates 25 October AD 47 (execution) and the uncertain span 6 to 
12 November (appearance).  The three remaining are: 
— TP Sulp 1 bis, which records a uadimonium executed on 10 November AD 
41 or 43-45 in Puteoli, reciting a sponsio of (perhaps) 2,666 sesterces by C. 
Varius Cartus in favour of (perhaps) C. Sulpicius Cinnamus for appearance in 
the forum at Puteoli on 12 November. 
— TP Sulp 3, which records a uadimonium executed on 3 July AD 48 in 
Puteoli, reciting a sponsio of 50,000 sesterces (the suit itself being worth more 
than this), and a ring worth 1,000 sesterces given as arra, by C. Sulpicius 
Faustus in favour of L. Faenius Eumenes for appearance in the forum at 
 
103) See C a m o d e c a  20–1. 
104) TP Sulp 1, 3, 4, 1 bis; TH 14, 15.  One might also include TH 13, except that it has 
been reconstructed on the basis of TH 14, and appears to be identical to it (except for 
abbreviations).  See G. P u g l i e s e  C a r r a t e l l i, Testi e documenti, Par. Pass. 3 (1948) 
168–9.  On the dates of appearance and execution in TH 15 (both 12 March), see 
C o s t a b i l e, (note 81) 224–6. <167> 
105) The dates given are based on the reconstructions of C a m o d e c a. 
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Puteoli on 5 July106). 
— TP Sulp 4, which records a uadimonium executed on 9 June AD 52 in 
Puteoli, reciting a fidepromissio of 1,200 sesterces by Zenon of Tyre in favour 
of C. Sulpicius Cinnamus for appearance in the forum at Puteoli on 11 June. 
For the reasons below, it seems likely that the three-day interval in each of 
these uadimonia marks them as Vertagungsuadimonia. 
 The relationship between the uadimonium and three-day intervals has been 
mentioned occasionally in the literature, but before the discovery of the lex 
Irnitana it was difficult to see what the relationship was.  Brisson argued that 
the words in diem tertium siue perendinum107) were part of the formal words 
for ordering a uadimonium, but believed that the uadimonium ensured the 
defendant's appearance apud iudicem108).  Meister agreed that the formal 
words for ordering a uadimonium somewhere <168> contained in diem 
tertium siue perendinum, but declined to speculate exactly how the words 
were used109).  K a r l o w a argued that three-day uadimonia were ordered as a 
matter of course during proceedings in iure110).  V o i g t argued that a three-
day uadimonium was used to introduce the trial phase in recuperatorial 
procedure111). 
 Such wide differences of opinion existed, because the available evidence 
suggested some relation between the uadimonium and three-day intervals 
without showing what the relation was.  The best evidence was in Macrobius 
(Sat. 1. 16. 14), describing various days observed in the calendar, and here, 
 
106) This tablet is discussed in more detail below. 
107) Probus 4.9 (FIRA II, p. 456): I.D.T.S.P in diem tertium siue perendinum.  See also 
Cic. pro Mur. 27: Iam illud mihi quidem mirum uideri solet, tot homines, tam ingeniosos, post 
tot annos etiam nunc statuere non potuisse utrum 'diem tertium' an 'perendinum', 'iudicem' an 
'arbitrum', 'rem' an 'litem' dici opporteret. 
108) B. Brisson, De formulis et sollemnibus (Paris 1583) 412.  Brisson adopted the now-
discarded view that the uadimonium was used between the two phases of the lawsuit; see note 
4.  The argument relies on G. 4. 15, where Gaius, in speaking of the legis actio per 
sacramentum, says: postea tamen quam iudex datus esset, comperendinum diem, ut ad 
iudicem uenirent, denuntiabant.  See also ps-Asc. at Cic. II in Verr. 1.  On how these passages 
may be reconciled with a three-day interruption in iure, see M e t z g e r  77–88, and 
Interrupting Proceedings in iure: uadimonium and intertium, ZPE 120 (1998) 219–20. <168> 
109) Meister (note 22) 298–99.  He notes: Sunt uero quidam in ea sententia, uadimonii 
diem olim semper fuisse tertium siue perendinum, ducti praecipue loco Ciceronis [pro Murena 
27] ...; aliorum scriptorum, qui uadimonium in tertium diem conceptum esse testantur.  Ibid. 
110) K a r l o w a  364–5.  Cf. F l i n i a u x  28–31, who finds unpersuasive K a r l o w a 's 
attempt to attribute the three-day interval to the in iure stage. 
111) V o i g t  332–5. 
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dies profesti: 
Comperendini [sc. dies sunt] quibus uadimonium licet dicere. 
But the meaning here is far from clear; dicere is an unusual word to find with 
uadimonium112) and the sense of quibus is ambiguous.  The comperendini dies 
should not be the days 'on which' the uadimonium is determined, as the words 
might suggest113).  Karlowa114) came the closest to what is probably the 
correct meaning (he paraphrases: 'comperendini dies sind solche, auf welche 
den Termin vor Gericht anzusagen gestattet ist.').  However, his formulation 
did not indicate exactly when this rule held, and was therefore vulnerable to 
counter-evidence showing that it was not always the custom to order three-day 
uadimonia115).  Other evidence associating <169> uadimonia with three-day 
interruptions is found in two accounts of Scipio Africanus (maior) presiding 
over lawsuits while at the same time conducting a campaign to capture a 
Spanish town. 
Aulus Gellius, NA 6.1.10-11: 
Scipio, manum ad ipsam oppidi quod obsidebatur arcem protendens, 'perendie', inquit, 
'sese sistant illo in loco.'  Atque ita factum; die tertio, in quem uadari iusserat, oppidum 
captum est eodemque die in arce eius oppidi ius dixit. 
Scipio, extending his hand toward the very fortress of the town under siege, said 'they 
shall make their appearance right there'.  At so it happened: on the third day, for which he 
had ordered them to promise their appearance, the town was captured, and on the same 
day he administered justice in the fortress of the town. 
Plutarch, Scipio 3: 
 
112) See F l i n i a u x  29–30 n.3.  F l i n i a u x  abandoned any effort to make sense of 
this text.  Ibid.  I suggest a translation below, note 124 and accompanying text. 
113) Although V o i g t  332–5 uses the Macrobius passage as evidence, he says that as a 
statement it is false, 'denn comperendinus dies is der Termin, nicht der Tag, an dem der 
Termin anberaumt wird ....'.  M. V o i g t, Die XII Tafeln. Geschichte und System des Civil- 
und Criminal-rechtes I (Leipzig, 1883) 641 n.23.  The quibus simply needs a different 
translation: see below note 124. 
114) K a r l o w a  364.  He understands Macrobius to be using uadimonium in the sense of 
'the court day fixed by the uadimonium', citing Cic. pro Quinct. 5.22: uenit ad uadimonium 
Naeuius. 
115) F l i n i a u x  29 n. 2 points out that in the Gellius passage cited below, the soldiers 
ask Scipio which day he will order them to reappear, therefore showing that a three-day 
interval was not the rule in every case. <169> <170> 
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ἐκέλευσεν ἐκεῖ τὰς ἐγ
He ordered them to promise uadimonia for appearance there, with the intention of hearing 
litigants on the third day. 
γύας ὁµολογεῖν, ὡς εἰς τρίτην ... ἀκουσόµενος τῶν 
ν ....  διαδικούντω
But compare: 
Valerius Maximus, Facta et Dicta Memorabilia 3.7.1b: 
Nam cum oppidum Badiam circumsederet, tribunal suum adeuntis in aedem, quae intra 
moenia hostium erat, uadimonium in posterum diem facere iussit continuoque urbe 
potitus et tempore et loco quo praedixerat sella posita ius eis dixit. 
For while he was laying seige to the town of Badia, he ordered the uadimonium of one 
who came to his tribunal to be made for the next day in a building which was behind 
enemy walls, and immediately on getting possession of the city he set up his court and 
administered justice at both the time and place he had earlier announced. 
Again, it is not clear how these passages should be interpreted.  In the most 
important detail the accounts are inconsistent (Valerius: 'for the next day'), and 
the relevance of the event—a postponement granted by a general in Spain in 
the third century BC—to classical Roman procedure cannot be taken for 
granted.  The last item of evidence relied on by earlier writers is from Gaius 
(29 ed. prov.) D. 2, 11, 8: 
Et si post tres aut quinque pluresue dies, quam iudicio sisti se [sc. uadimonium] reus 
promisit, secum agendi potestatem fecerit nec actoris ius ex mora deterius factum sit, 
consequens est dici defendi eum debere per exceptionem. 
And if three or five or more days after a defendant has promised a uadimonium, he shall 
have made a suit against him possible, and the plaintiff's position is not made worse by 
the delay, it follows that the defendant ought to have a defence, by an exceptio. 
The text seems to address the relief permitted to a defendant who has not 
appeared to his uadimonium, but nevertheless submits to litis contestatio.  If 
<170> it were part of the urban edict, it would probably be among the 
provisions treating Si quis uadimoniis non obtemperuerit116).  Like the 
Macrobius passage, it suggests in a vague way that a uadimonium might create 
an interval of three days117). 
 On the whole, therefore, earlier efforts to discover the relationship between 
 
116) L e n e l  § 269. 
117) K a r l o w a  364. 
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the uadimonium and intervals of three days were based on very little evidence.  
There was enough evidence to show that a relationship might exist, but not 
enough evidence to reveal the actual conditions under which a person would 
promise by uadimonium to appear after three days.  The lex Irnitana reveals 
some of these conditions.  It does so, not in speaking directly about 
uadimonium, which it addresses only very briefly118), but in a very detailed 
description of the practice of interrupting proceedings in iure.  Under certain 
circumstances these interruptions would last for three days119). 
 The chapters of the lex Irnitana which treat the administration of justice 
generally follow the chronology of a lawsuit and, among these chapters, 
chapter 90 holds a position between the treatment of proceedings in iure and 
proceedings apud iudicem120).  The text of this chapter anticipates two <171> 
alternatives: (1) that the parties-to-be, having already appeared, will reappear 
before the magistrate after three days in order to complete, if possible, litis 
contestatio, or (2) that the parties- and the judge-to-be will commence trial 
after an agreed interval of days.  In both cases it expresses the interval with the 
word intertium.  It first states a rule: the magistrate grants an intertium to the 
day-after-the-next121).  It then states an exception: the magistrate grants an 
 
118) See c. K, ll. 34–44.  I have argued elsewhere that these lines indirectly reflect the 
practice of granting three-day uadimonia.  See M e t z g e r  (note 108) 223–5.  Cf. A. 
R o d g e r, Postponed Business at Irni, JRS 86 (1996) 65–73. 
119) The lex Irnitana dates to AD 91 and is a copy of a Flavian municipal law of perhaps 
AD 78.  References here are to J. G o n z á l e z, The lex Irnitana: A New Copy of the Flavian 
Municipal Law, JRS 76 (1986) 147–243, except that 'in tertium' appears here as 'intertium'.  
For other editions, see M e t z g e r  3–4, and for other copies of the Flavian law, see 
M e t z g e r  2 nn. 4–10.  The lex Irnitana governed various matters of local administration in 
the Baetican municipium of Irni.  The statute says expressly that several procedural rules, 
including the three-day interval, are part of Roman procedure as well as of the procedure in 
Irni.  See lex Irni. c. 91, col. A, l. 53 – col. B, l. 10; col. B, ll. 17–21; M e t z g e r  4–5.  
However, some of the details of the three-day interval are described without any reference to 
the practice at Rome.  This means that, although the three-day interval is part of Roman 
practice, some of the details known to us may not themselves be Roman. 
120) The chronology is not perfectly observed, but on the whole the subject matter in this 
sequence of chapters tends to follow the progress of a lawsuit.  See A. R o d g e r, The lex 
Irnitana and Procedure in the Civil Courts, JRS 81 (1991) 78.  According to some, chapter 90 
is not concerned with the in iure stage.  See id. 78 n. 23; J. A. C r o o k, Cambridge Law 
Journal (1998) 414; J. C r o o k, et al., Intertiumjagd and the lex Irnitana: A Colloquium, ZPE 
70 (1987) 176.  This is a difficult judgment to make on the basis of the sequence of chapters, 
because chapter 90 falls between treatments of the first and second stage.  The fact that 
chapter 90 is concerned entirely with the acts <171> of magistrates is surely significant.  See 
D. J o h n s t o n, Three Thoughts on Roman Private Law and the lex Irnitana, JRS 77 (1987) 
71. 
121) Chapter 90, ll. 27–9: Quicumque in eo municipio IIuir iure dicundo praerit, per quos 
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intertium to another day, if the parties- and the judge-to-be can agree on a 
day122).  The aim of the rule and exception, it appears, is to allow a case to 
proceed to trial if it is ready to do so, but to interrupt the suit before litis 
contestatio for three days if, for example, a judge cannot be appointed 
immediately123). <172> 
 There is a third circumstance that the text does not anticipate.  It does not 
anticipate the circumstance in which proceedings ought to be postponed to a 
specific day other than three days, but there is nevertheless no immediately 
available judge to lend his agreement.  This must have occurred fairly often as 
when, for example, it was known that a party-to-be would be unavailable until 
a particular day.  One assumes that the magistrate had the authority to order 
the defendant's reappearance for that specific day, but this circumstance and 
the way it would be handled are not mentioned.  His authority in this respect 
 
dies ex hac lege ibi iudicia fieri licebit oportebit, in eos dies omnes intertium dato.  The fact 
that he must grant intertium (to paraphrase) 'to all trial days' might suggest that the terminus of 
the interval must be the trial and not litis contestatio.  However, the rule is probably 
recognizing the wisdom of allowing the judge to take the suit on a day when he can actually 
preside.  Moreover, that the statute should specify 'to a l l days on which trials may take place' 
is an attempt to include both classes of trial days (those which are generally permissible, and 
those which are permissible only with the agreement of the parties and judge: see c. 90, ll. 31–
7; c. 92, ll. 27–46).  That the interval will span three days is supported by the fact that in diem 
tertium (= comperendinatio) was part of a formal legal vocabulary (see the sources cited 
above, note 107), and by the fact that under certain conditions the intertium was announced 
(presumably by plaintiff to defendant) 'in biduo proximo', see c. 91, col. A, l. 49; c. 92, l. 47, 
which perhaps permits an announcement within two days of the granting of intertium, for an 
appearance on the third day.  Moreover, in one of the tablets from Puteoli, TP 24, a trial on the 
perendinus dies appears to be the consequence of intertium sumere.  See generally 
M e t z g e r  79–80. 
122) Chapter 90, ll. 31–7: Item si inter eos, inter quos ambigetur, et iudicem, qui inter eos 
iudicare debebit, in aliquem diem uti intertium inter eos detur conueniet, neque is dies propter 
uenerationem domus Augustae festus erit feriarumue numero propter eandem causam haberi 
debebit, in eum diem intertium inter eos dato. 
123) The interruption of proceedings in iure is not a part of most explanations of 
intertium, which follow d ' O r s in interpreting intertium as a bridge between the two stages.  
A. d ' O r s, Nuevos datos de la ley Irnitana, SDHI 49 (1983) 40–3.  Yet intertium seems to 
serve as a bridge only in the exceptional case set out in c. 90, ll. 31–7, quoted above.  This is 
suggested by, among other things, the fact that the conditional relative clause qui inter eos 
iudicare debebit is inserted after iudicem, and by the fact that the statute appears to distinguish 
intertium denuntiare from intertium denuntiare iudicandi causa, compare c. 91, col. A, ll. 48–
9, with c. 92, ll. 46–7.  On the uncertainty surrounding a given judge's selection, see D. 50, 5, 
13 pr. and D. h. t. 13, 3 <172> (Ulp. 23 ed.).  The arguments for the explanation adopted here 
are set out in full in M e t z g e r, chapters 4, 5, and 6.  See also D. I b b e t s o n, Journal of 
Legal History 19 (1998) 186–7; J. A. C r o o k, Cambridge Law Journal (1998) 413–15; A. 
L i n t o t t, JRS 89 (1999) 235–6. 
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does not seem to be excluded by any language. 
 A magistrate in Irni will therefore grant a three-day interval in iure unless 
the statute instructs him to the contrary.  Gaius says (G. 4. 184) that when 
business cannot be finished on a given day, the defendant must make a 
uadimonium.  Because a defendant ordinarily would not appear again in iure 
voluntarily, a three-day interval will entail a three-day uadimonium.  In this 
way the lex Irnitana is suggesting that three-day uadimonia were ordered in 
default of any other instruction. 
 The procedures at Irni, of course, are not necessarily those in Italy or at 
Rome.  The lex Irnitana itself (c. 91) tells us that the three-day interval (and 
by implication the three-day uadimonium) was a feature of iudicia legitima, 
but the specific conditions are not certain.  With this limitation in mind, the 
sources on three-day uadimonia cited above may be interpreted as follows. 
 (1)  The statement by Macrobius (Sat. 1. 16. 14) associating uadimonium 
with comperendinus dies may be interpreted to mean that a magistrate 
sometimes ordered the parties to engage in a uadimonium for appearance on 
the third day, and may be translated: 'Days-after-tomorrow are those days 
according to which a magistrate may determine a uadimonium'124). <173> 
 (2)  Gellius and Plutarch have improved the story of Scipio Africanus by 
incorporating a practice—the three-day interval—of their own time.  The 
writers' aim, of course, is to show a general so confident of events that he saw 
no reason to alter the usual procedure, and a reader can better appreciate the 
story if a contemporary and perhaps familiar procedure is substituted125). 
 (3)  When Gaius (D. 2. 11. 8) speaks about a defence available to a 
defendant who despite non-appearance to his uadimonium has nevertheless 
submitted to the suit, he uses the uadimonium-interval 'three or five or more 
days' as an example.  The example is significant, because three days represents 
one intertium while five days represents two (that is, an appearance on the 
third day and a further three-day postponement).  Gaius therefore appears to 
 
124) On this understanding the quibus is an ablative of specification, as described in J.B. 
Hofmann & A. Szantyr, Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik (Munich, 1965) 134–5, which makes 
special note of the use of this ablative with numerals.  The use of dicere is not out of place if 
we recall the magistrate's somewhat indirect involvement in the uadimonium procedure: he 
'orders' (iubet) the uadimonium to be made, see Livy 23. 32; Probus 6. 63; cf. Val. Max. Facta 
et dicta mem. 3. 7. 1b; Pliny Hist. Nat. 7. 53 (iudex?); Plutarch Scipio 3, but it is the claimant 
who stipulates for his adversary's appearance, see e.g. Papinian (2 quaest.) D. 45, 1, 115 pr. in 
answer to which the adversary promises to appear on the third day. <173> 
125) Whether Plutarch's reference to εἰς τρίτην is a deliberate translation of intertium is 
uncertain, as ἡµέρα is often implied, see H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge/MA 
1920) § 1027b. <174> 
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acknowledge the practice of employing uadimonia for intervals of three days. 
 (4)  The three uadimonia from Puteoli which recite three-day intervals 
appear to reflect the practice of postponing proceedings in iure for three days.  
It is barely conceivable that in each case the length of the interval was 
determined voluntarily (see lex Irni. c. 90, ll. 31-7), and not by reference to a 
practice of postponing proceedings in iure for three days.  But the uniformity 
of the evidence counsels against this: only four uadimonia for local 
appearance are available for consideration (preserving the two relevant dates), 
and three of these four carry the same interval.  It is unlikely that, in three out 
of the four cases available to us, the parties voluntarily chose the same interval 
of days. 
 Accordingly three of the Puteoli uadimonia appear to be 
Vertagungsuadimonia, and not extra-judicial uadimonia.  This contradicts the 
claim that all of the Herculaneum and Puteoli uadimonia are extra-judicial.  
Moreover, there is some reason to doubt Arangio-Ruiz' argument that three of 
the Herculaneum uadimonia are extra-judicial because they lack any reference 
to a magistrate's decretum.  The three Vertagungsuadimonia identified above 
contain no form of words indicating the magistrate's participation, and by 
analogy perhaps a Verweisungsuadimonium required no such form of words 
either. 
d)  TP Sulp 3 
 One of the uadimonia identified above as a Vertagungsuadimonium (TP 
Sulp 3) contains language which has been interpreted to suggest that it is, 
<174> instead, an extra-judicial uadimonium.  The document is part of a 
lawsuit between Lucius Faenius Eumenes (plaintiff) and Caius Sulpicius 
Faustus (defendant), a lawsuit to which three of the Puteoli tablets refer126).  
The relevant portions of the two uadimonia in the case are below (from 
Camodeca, abbreviations resolved). 
TP Sulp 2: Vadimonium factum Caio Sulpicio Fausto in VIII kalendas Iulias primas, 
Puteolis in foro ante aram Hordionianam hora tertia; HS 50,000 acturus ex empto dari 
stipulatus est Lucius Faenius Eumenes, spopondit Caius Sulpicius Faustus. 
TP Sulp 3 (scriptura exterior, ll. 1-8): Vadimonium factum Caio Sulpicio Fausto in III 
nonas Iulias primas, Puteolis in foro ante aram Augusti Hordionianam hora tertia; HS 
50,000 maioris summae rei in iudicium deducturus et HS 1,000 depositi anuli arrae 
nomine stipulatus est Lucius Faenius Eumenes, spopondit Caius Sulpicius Faustus. 
 
126) TP Sulp 2 (uadimonium), TP Sulp 3 (uadimonium), TP Sulp 27 (= TP 66) (settlement 
agreement).  See W o l f (note 98) 769–88. 
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The first tablet is conspicuous for the fact that it recites the nature of the 
lawsuit, an actio ex empto127).  The second tablet is conspicuous for the fact 
that, after reciting the sum promised, it says that the suit itself is for an amount 
greater than the sum.  Both tablets refer to the suit in the future tense (TP Sulp 
2: acturus; TP Sulp 3: deducturus). 
 One of the early editors of the tablets noted the use of the future acturus in 
TP Sulp 2 and 15 and suggested that this marked them as extra-judicial 
uadimonia128); by the same logic TP Sulp 3 is extra-judicial on the evidence of 
deducturus.  It seems unlikely, however, that a uadimonium could be 
identified as extra-judicial on this evidence.  The future tense in each of these 
examples is almost certainly looking forward to litis contestatio, and is 
therefore no more appropriate to an extra-judicial uadimonium than to a 
judicial uadimonium.  That in iudicium deducturus is looking forward to litis 
<175> contestatio is plain129).  That acturus is also looking forward to litis 
contestatio is very likely; it is well known that agere often describes a 
plaintiff's participation at litis contestatio, even though the precise relationship 
between agere and litis contestatio is a matter of debate130).  Two texts cited 
by Wlassak131) illustrate the relationship well.  The first is from Julian, in 
Ulpian (46 Sab.) D. 46. 1. 5.  He is describing the case of a promisee under a 
 
127) See also TP Sulp 15 (a uadimonium to Rome), tab. I, l. 6: acturus ex uendito. 
128) C. G i o r d a n o, Nuove tavolette cerate Pompeiane, Rendiconti Napoli 46 (1971 but 
1972) 185–6.  The argument mirrors an argument by K i p p about two juristic sources.  Paul 
(1 Plaut.) D. 2. 11. 10. 2: Qui iniuriarum a c t u r u s est, stipulatus erat ante litem 
contestatam ut aduersarius suus iudicio sistat: commissa stipulatione mortuus est.  Non 
competere heredi eius ex stipulatu actionem placuit ....  Ulpian (74 ed.) D. 44. 2. 5: ... si quis 
mandati a c t u r u s, cum ei aduersarius iudicio sistendi causa [sc. uadimonium] promisisset, 
propter eandem rem agat negotiorum gestorum uel condicat, de eadem re agit.  K i p p  
argues that the use of the future in each of these texts identifies the respective uadimonia as 
Ladungsuadimonia.  K i p p (note 9) 178–9.  This argument is equally answered by the 
discussion below. <175> 
129) See H. Cancik & H. Schneider (edd.), Der neue Pauly III (Stuttgart 1997) s.v. 
'Deductio'; M. W l a s s a k, Die Litiskontestation im Formularprozess (Leipzig 1889) 20–3, 
with citations. 
130) M. W l a s s a k, Die klassische Prozeßformel (Vienna 1924) 64 n. 15: 'Das im 
Munde der Klassiker agere wie petere regelmäßig = litem contestari ist, braucht jetzt kaum 
noch dargetan zu werden.'; M. W l a s s a k, Römische Processgesetze II (Leipzig 1891) 357; 
cf. G. J a h r, Litis Contestatio (Graz 1960) 72–4.  On 'actor' see e.g. S. R i c c o b o n o, Die 
Vererblichkeit der Strafklagen, SZ (1927) 94: 'Vor der Litiskontestation gibt es keinen actor, 
sondern nur den "qui agere vult" und dem "cum quo agitur".'  Similarly, K a s e r/H a c k l  
204 n. 2. 
131) W l a s s a k cites these texts for the thesis that agere describes the plaintiff's act at 
the moment of litis contestatio.  See W l a s s a k  (note 129) 40–42.  His explanation is that 
there can be no agere until a formula has been decided. <176> 
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stipulation, who then becomes heir to another promisee under the same 
stipulation. 
Plane si ex altera earum [obligationum] e g e r i t, utramque consumet, uidelicet quia 
natura obligationum duarum, quas haberet, ea esset, ut, cum altera earum in iudicium 
deduceretur, altera consumeretur. 
Clearly if he should sue on one obligation the other will be consumed, simply because the 
nature of the two obligations that he has is such that, when one is brought to joinder of 
issue, the other is consumed. 
The second is from Gaius (Institutes 4. 98), on the duty of procurators to give 
security. 
Procurator uero si agat, satisdare iubetur ratam rem dominum habiturum.  Periculum enim 
est ne iterum dominus de eadem re experiatur.  Quod periculum non interuenit si per 
cognitorem a c t u m  f u e r i t, quia de qua re quisque per cognitorem e g e r i t, de ea non 
magis amplius actionem habet quam si ipse egerit. 
But if a procurator is bringing an action, he is ordered to give security that his principal 
will indeed ratify his acts.  The danger is that the principal may sue again on the same 
matter.  There is however no such danger if a cognitor brought the action, because anyone 
who sued on a matter through a cognitor has no greater right to sue on that matter than if 
he brought the suit himself. 
In short, there is nothing to indicate that the words acturus ex empto or acturus 
ex uendito were necessarily uttered before the parties had appeared in iure. 
<176> 
 A more difficult problem is raised by the reference in TP Sulp 3 to the fact 
that the defendant is to be sued for a sum greater than the sum he has 
promised.  The problem is that at first glance this language does not appear to 
comport with the rules governing judicial uadimonia, and this suggests that TP 
Sulp 3 must therefore be an extra-judicial uadimonium, to which (on this 
reasoning) the rules of judicial uadimonia do not apply132).  The relevant rules 
are found in Gaius (Institutes 4. 186), who says that a judicial uadimonium, 
with certain exceptions not applicable here, must recite a sum that is not 
greater than half of the amount claimed, and in any event not more than 
 
132) On what follows see especially D. N ö r r, Zur condemnatione cum taxatione im 
römischen Zivilprozeß, 112 SZ (1995) 80–2.  Both C a m o d e c a  52 and W o l f  (note 98) 
783 n. 39 argue that Gaius' rules do not apply to extra-judicial uadimonia; Camodeca adds that 
the sum promised in the stipulation will at least be roughly equal to the amount in controversy.  
Cf. U. M a n t h e, Labeo 40 (1994) 370–1 & n. 7, saying that the question is unresolved. 
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100,000 sesterces133).  Accordingly one way to explain the 'greater than 
50,000' language is to conclude that the suit is worth 100,000 and that 50,000 
is a reflection of Gaius' rule.  But the defendant is also promising an additional 
1,000, and this means either that the plaintiff is demanding more than Gaius' 
rule would permit (assuming a suit worth 100,000), or that when the tablet 
says 'greater than 50,000', it means 'greater than 100,000'.  If the latter 
alternative is correct, one would then have to explain why, in the earlier 
uadimonium in the same suit, the plaintiff has demanded that the defendant 
promise less than half of the amount in controversy.  Both alternatives would 
suggest that the tablets are not following Gaius' rules for the judicial 
uadimonium and that they are accordingly extra-judicial. 
 A uadimonium in an actio ex empto, where the intentio is incerta and the 
judge condemns the defendant in accordance with good faith, raises 
difficulties which are not present in actions where the amount in controversy is 
certain.  It is obviously not a straightforward matter for a magistrate to 
calculate one-half of an amount which will only be determined later by the 
judge.  A similar difficulty arises in the actio iniuriarum, though the sources 
there are more helpful134).  For guidance on the present issue we have 
principally G. 4. 186, which says that the plaintiff must swear that the amount 
he requests is not requested for the sake of being vexatious.  I suggest that if 
the magistrate within the constraints of this rule accepted a sum as the <177> 
maximum amount in controversy, then this would be enough to explain the 
'greater than 50,000' language in TP Sulp 3.  That is, if Faenius' actio ex empto 
is worth a s  m u c h  a s 100,000135), as the 50,000 figure in TP Sulp 2 
indicates, then TP Sulp 3 would suggest, as it appears to, that the suit will be 
for more than 50,000 but perhaps less than 100,000.  One supposes the 
additional claim for 1,000 depositi anuli arrae nomine is the subject of a 
separate action136).  If the above analysis is correct, then TP Sulp 3 complies 
with the rules for judicial uadimonia, and need not be classified as extra-
 
133) The rules are to some degree reconstructed from an imperfect text: see the authorities 
cited in N ö r r  (note 132) 79 n.117. 
134) See Paul, Coll. 2. 6. 1; G. 3. 224; N ö r r  (note 132) 77–8. <177> 
135) This figure might indeed represent the largest suit that could be brought locally, 
though the evidence for this is lacking, see W o l f  (note 98) 783 n. 39; C a m o d e c a  52.  
On the other hand, the fact that the parties anticipated transferring the case to Rome, see TP 
Sulp 27; W o l f  (note 98) 782–3, raises the possibility that the case in some way exceeded 
local competence. 
136) See the authorities cited in N ö r r  (note 132) 80 n. 125.  Several of the Puteoli 
uadimonia (TP Sulp 1, 5, 8, and possibly 7) recite multiple sums; these may represent separate 
actions, although it has been suggested that they represent debts supported by separate 
sureties, see G i m é n e z - C a n d e l a  (note 95) 187–8. 
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judicial on account of a supposed divergence from those rules137). 
V.  Summary 
 In the modern literature the extra-judicial uadimonium has been the subject 
of three successive views.  It is unfortunately only the first of these views—the 
now rejected view that the extra-judicial uadimonium was treated in the 
praetor's edict—that offered direct evidence for this uadimonium.  Since the 
rejection of the 'edictal view', examples of and allusions to the extra-judicial 
uadimonium are drawn solely from indirect evidence.  That is, the extra-
judicial character of a uadimonium must now somehow be identified from its 
context.  This is often a very difficult thing to do, because an extra-judicial 
uadimonium necessarily resembles the two <178> judicial uadimonia.  Under 
the current view, in fact, the task of distinguishing among the three uadimonia 
is especially difficult: each of the three comprises a promise to appear near a 
magistrate's tribunal, and uses the same form of words.  In light of the current 
view, the following conclusions were presented above. 
 (1)  The proposition that the extra-judicial uadimonium was the customary 
way of introducing a lawsuit in the late Republic is not supported by the 
evidence.  Specifically, (a) under the current view the proposition cannot be 
supported, as formerly, on the scarcity of references to in ius uocatio; (b) 
Cicero's pro Quinctio contains no examples of the extra-judicial uadimonium; 
(c) the uadimonium referred to in Cicero II in Verr. 5. 34 is probably not an 
extra-judicial uadimonium; and (d) the uadimonium referred to in Cicero pro 
Tullio 20, though it may indeed be extra-judicial, cannot support wider claims 
about the prevalence of extra-judicial uadimonia. 
 (2)  The proposition that all of the Herculaneum and Puteoli uadimonia are 
extra-judicial is not supported by the evidence.  Specifically, (a) these 
 
137) To explain why TP Sulp 3 takes the trouble to recite the 'greater than ...' language is a 
separate question.  G i m é n e z - C a n d e l a  (note 95) 188, mentions that it was perhaps 
necessary in actions bonae fidei to recite the nature of the action, but she does not attempt to 
explain why it was necessary, nor why the nature of the action is not mentioned in TP Sulp 3 
(apparently the same good-faith action as in TP Sulp 2).  N ö r r  (note 132) 81, who interprets 
TP Sulp 3 as extra-judicial, suggests that the plaintiff is reserving for himself the right to 
exceed the sum named in the uadimonium.  A further possibility is that Faenius is seeking 
adequately to protect himself in the event Sulpicius does not appear, and that the inclusion of 
'greater than ...' (as perhaps the inclusion of 'acturus ex empto' in TP Sulp 2) would give 
Faenius the opportunity of bringing an actio in factum for his loss, or an actio incerti ex 
stipulatu, the stipulation in TP Sulp 3 treated as one for quanti ea res erit (see Neratius, D. 2, 
11, 14 i.f.).  But this is speculation. 
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uadimonia have not yet been successfully identified en masse as extra-judicial, 
either on the basis of internal indicia or external evidence; (b) three of the 
Puteoli uadimonia (TP Sulp 1 bis, 3, 4) are Vertagungsuadimonia and 
therefore not extra-judicial; (c) the argument that three of the Herculaneum 
uadimonia (TH 13, 14, 15) are extra-judicial Verweisungsuadimonia because 
they lack the decretum of a magistrate is less persuasive, in light of the fact 
that among the tablets are three Vertagungsuadimonia which themselves do 
not reflect the magistrate's participation; and (d) given the presence of three 
Vertagungsuadimonia among the tablets, one cannot identify all of the tablets 
as extra-judicial uadimonia on the assumption that they share a single model. 
Errata 
Note 15 Voigt 345 315 
Note 17 Gimenez Giménez 
Note 75 Deductio deductio  
